Søren Kierkegaard’s view of faith found in Fear and Trembling and Practice In Christianity by Pulliam, David
		
 
SØREN KIERKEGAARD’S VIEW OF FAITH FOUND IN FEAR AND TREMBLING 
AND PRACTICE IN CHRISTIANITY 
 
 
 
 
David Pulliam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree 
Master of Arts 
in the Department of Philosophy 
Indiana University  
 
September 2016 
  
 ii 
 
Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
 
 
Master’s Thesis Committee 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
Dr. Samuel J.M. Khan, PhD  
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
Dr. Cornelis de Waal, PhD  
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
Dr. David Pfeifer, PhD 
 
 
 
 
  
 iii 
David Pulliam 
Søren Kierkegaard’s view of Faith found in Fear and Trembling and Practice in 
Christianity 
 In this paper I discuss two key works written by Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and 
Trembling and Practice in Christianity, under the pseudonyms Johannes de Silentio and 
Anti-Climacus respectively. I focus on three questions: what is Johannes view of faith, 
what is Anti-Climacus’ view of faith and how are these Kierkegaard’s conclusions?  I 
argue that stemming from Johannes’ and Anti-Climacus’ points of view, Kierkegaard’s 
view of faith is the aligning of the self in a trusting relationship with the God-man. One 
outside of faith can perceive faith to be a paradox or find faith offensive; one must have 
faith to avoid offense and overcome the paradox. 
 Chapter 1 focuses on the connection between Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms 
using his work The Point of View. In this chapter I map out Kierkegaard’s method of 
communication and the purpose for his use of pseudonyms.  
 Chapter 2 focuses on Johannes’ view of faith in Fear and Trembling. Johannes 
says that faith is formed through a private relationship with God. One with faith is silent 
about this relationship from the point of view of one who is in the ethical. Johannes 
understands faith dialectically. Faith is a paradox to Johannes because he does not 
understand the justification for Abraham’s action. 
 Chapter 3 focuses on Anti-Climacus’ view of faith in Practice in Christianity. 
Anti-Climacus presents a rigorous account of faith. He says faith is being a contemporary 
of the God-man and meeting the requirements of believing the God-man’s words. When 
one becomes a contemporary with the God-man one can become offended by the God-
 iv 
man because the God-man is in collision with the established order, he, as man, claims to 
be God, he, as God, appears to be man, or the God-man speaks indirectly.  
 Chapter 4 focuses on explaining how Johannes’ and Anti-Climacus’ view 
complement each other. Out of these two points of view Kierkegaard’s view of faith is 
the aligning of the self in a trusting relationship with the God-man. One outside of faith 
can perceive faith to be a paradox or find faith offensive; one must have faith to avoid 
offense and overcome the paradox. 
 
Dr. Samuel J.M. Khan, PhD 
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Chapter 1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In this paper I will compare two views of faith in Søren Kierkegaard’s writings, 
Fear and Trembling and Practice in Christianity, which were written under pseudonyms, 
Johannes de Silentio and Anti-Climacus, respectively. A pseudonym is a fictitious name 
used by a writer to conceal his identity.  I will be asking three questions: what did 
Johannes de Silentio conclude about faith in Fear and Trembling? What did Anti-
Climacus conclude abouMt faith in Practice in Christianity?  Are these conclusions 
Kierkegaard’s conclusions?  
 I use the term “Kierkegaard” generally to refer to the writer of Point of View and 
assume that this Kierkegaard is the person behind the Kierkegaardian corpus. There are 
points where I change my use of this term. But when I do so, I give the appropriate 
qualification. I use the terms “Johannes de Silentio” and “Anti-Climacus” to refer to the 
authors of Fear and Trembling and Practice in Christianity. As we will see, Kierkegaard 
used this literary tool to do more than just conceal his identity.  These pseudonyms are the 
names of personae that, although both “created” by Kierkegaard, hold different points of 
view and so have separate identities from each other. Johannes comes from a perspective 
that lacks faith, whereas Anti-Climacus has a perspective of faith. They provide different 
accounts of faith.  
Faith in Fear and Trembling is unknown and unreachable by one without faith. 
Faith in Practice in Christianity is being a contemporary with the God-Man and lacks 
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being “offended at”1 the God-man. Out of these two points of view of faith I will argue 
that Kierkegaard’s view of faith emerges as the aligning of the self in a trusting 
relationship with the God-man. One outside of faith can perceive faith to be a paradox or 
find faith offensive; one must have faith to avoid offense and overcome the paradox.  
A key part of my method is using Point of View as a source for understanding the 
purpose of Kierkegaard’s writings and his pseudonyms. Kierkegaard’s purpose for writing 
gives us the basis to make claims about Kierkegaard’s view while discussing his 
pseudonyms’ points of view. It knits together the apparently disparate claims as 
Kierkegaard’s. Kierkegaard’s purpose for writing and using pseudonyms is the underlying 
purpose that allows for us to make an attempt at getting at what Kierkegaard concluded.  
In order to show that Johannes’ and Anti-Climacus’ conclusions about faith are 
Kierkegaard’s conclusions, it is necessary to map out the connection between Kierkegaard 
and his pseudonyms. To do so, I give a brief overview of Point of View and its purpose 
specifically addressing Kierkegaard’s claim to be a religious and Christian author. Then I 
discuss Kierkegaard’s attempt at indirect communication through pseudonyms. Lastly, I 
answer three objections.  
II. Overview of Point of View and its Purpose 
 
Point of View is not a roadmap for Kierkegaard’s works, intended to guide the 
reader through each twist and turn. It does not explain how each work is positioned in the 
Kierkegaardian corpus or the exact point of view of each pseudonym. Rather, Point of 
View is a map of the general purpose for the Kierkegaardian corpus. It shows the whole 
                                                
1  Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans. Howard H. Hong & Edna. H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1848/1991), 71.  
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forest, leaving out the particular details of the individual trees. As one can look at a forest 
in many different ways, so one can look at Kierkegaard’s works in different ways. Point of 
View is one such view that espouses a specific viewpoint of the Kierekgaard corpus.  
Point of View begins with “The Accounting.” In it Kierkegaard explains the 
evolution or movement of his authorship from Either/Or up to Discourses at Communion 
on Fridays. Kierkegaard says,“….the authorship, regarded as a totality, is religious from 
first to last, something anyone who can see…”2  
It’s not that at the time of each writing Kierkegaard had religious intentions. 
Rather it is in hindsight that one can see the religious motive. “The movement [of his 
authorship] was…the religious completely cast into reflection, yet in such a way that it is 
completely taken back out of reflection into simplicity – that is, he will see the traversed 
path is: to reach, to arrive at simplicity.”3 This arrival “at simplicity” is referring to the 
growing focus of his works toward the religious. Early works, called aesthetic works, have 
tendencies toward the religious. As Kierkegaard’s writing developed, his works became 
increasingly focused on the religious.  
Kierkegaard writes in his journals that he intended Point of View to accompany the 
second edition of his popular work, Either/Or.4 Worried that some might misunderstand 
the second publishing of Either/Or, an aesthetic work, Kierkegaard intended to clarify the 
“whole” of his work in Point of View.  Concerned that this “direct communication” might 
cause even more confusion, he considered using a pseudonym and almost didn’t publish 
                                                
2Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of View, trans. Howard H. Hong & Edna. H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1859/1998), 6.   
3 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 6-7. 
4 Journals: Pap. X A 117 n.d. 1849. 
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anything.5 Eventually, one part was published as “On My Work as an Author.” The rest 
was published posthumously.      
III. Kierkegaard’s Claim to be a Religious and Christian Author 
 
In Point of View, Kierkegaard claims to be a religious and Christian author. This is 
fundamental to my thesis about faith in Fear and Trembling and Practice in Christianity. 
A religious author is one “whose total thought is what it means to become a Christian.”6 
This means that Kierkegaard understood a religious author to be someone whose overall 
focus in his work is to consider how one goes about becoming a Christian. “Thus the 
authorship, regarded as a totality, is religious from first to last, something anyone who can 
see.”7 Alastair Hannay says, "He had been religious all along, 'The nerve in all my activity 
as a writer,' he says, 'is really to be found in the fact that I was essentially religious when I 
wrote Either/Or.'"8 
George Pattison makes a distinction between two types of "religiousness" in 
Kierkegaard’s writings, the first type leading into the second. First is the “immanent” form 
of religiousness. An individual is religious in this sense if s/he holds to “ethical” principles 
that provide ways of understanding the world. These principles depend on “the universal 
conditionals of human consciousness.” The second type of religiousness begins when the 
first reaches a “climax” in someone. Pattison describes this transition: when the individual 
“realizes their own nothingness and in that recognition becomes altogether open to God, 
                                                
5 Journals: JP VI 6361 (Pap. X A 147 n.d. 1849). 
6 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 47. 
7 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 6. 
8 Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 383. 
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and a transcendent faith, a faith which takes as its starting point the paradox of the God-in-
time, the incarnation of Jesus Christ.”9 In the second form of religiousness, one depends 
on “faith in an event outside the innate capacities of the human mind and is therefore said 
to be transcendent.”10 The Kierkegaard of Point of View is a religious author in this latter 
sense. Kierkegaard sees his work as being accomplished through something 
transcendental. “That I have needed and how I have continuously needed God’s assistance 
day after day, year after year – in order to turn my mind to that, in order to be able to state 
it accurately…”11 He goes on to say, “Thus throughout all my work as an author I have 
incessantly needed God’s assistance in order to be able to do it as a simple work 
assignment for which specific hours are allocated each day.”12 Kierkegaard believed that 
in order to do his work he needed divine help; it is in this sense that he is a religious 
author.  
Kierkegaard is also a Christian author. He says, “my whole authorship pertains to 
Christianity, to the issue: becoming a Christian.”13 “Christian” in Kierkegaard’s writings 
does not refer to someone who is a member of a church or someone who follows 
ceremonial practices of a particular religion. Rather, Kierkegaard defines a Christian in 
“Armed Neutrality” as someone who has a “militant piety,”14 concentrated on the life of 
                                                
9 George, Pattison, Kierkegaard, the Aesthetic and the Religious: From the Magic Theatre 
to the Crucifixion of the Image (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 155. 
10 Pattison, Kierkegaard, 155. 
11 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 72.  
12 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 74.  
13 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 23.  
14 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 130. NB: Armed Neutrality was published after 
Kierkegaard’s death. It technically is not a part of the Kierekgardian corpus. Yet, in it, 
Kierkegaard explains what a “Christian” is in the context of Kierkegaard’s Denmark: 
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Christ. In an early journal entry, he says, “Christian dogmatics, it seems to me, must grow 
out of Christ’s activity, and all the more so because Christ did not establish any doctrine; 
he acted. He did not teach there was redemption for men, but he redeemed men.”15 One 
with militant piety will be focused on living out how Christ lived or acted and not merely 
creating doctrine or following ceremonial practices.   
Anti-Climacus develops this concept of militant piety in Practice in Christianity as 
being “rigorous.” A Christian is someone who is rigorous in following Christ. Anti-
Climacus calls this “becoming a contemporary with Christ” who is the “proto-type”16 of 
the ideal picture of the Christian. Though this is not Kierkegaard speaking, it is important 
to recognize that Kierkegaard saw himself as one striving in the way Anti-Climacus 
describes. In a later chapter, I will discuss Kierkegaard’s reason for using Anti-Climacus 
as a pseudonym. But the basic idea is that Kierkegaard thought his life was not sufficiently 
good to be an example of a life of faith. David D. Possen explains, “Kierkegaard has Anti-
Climacus say the things Kierkegaard believes must be said."17 Practice in Christianity 
needed one who could give the high calling to return to faith to Denmark. Kierkegaard did 
not think he was in a position to give this call. Hannay says that Kierkegaard “felt unable 
to present himself in his own person as someone able to exemplify those standards and to 
                                                
someone who is not a Christian by the church’s standards, but someone who works at 
being a “Christian.”  
15 Journals: I A, 27 (JP I, 412). I think it is appropriate to note that at this time in 
Kierkegaard’s life, part of his major focus was on issues in systematic theology (Christian 
dogmatics). 
16 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 131. 
17 David D. Possen, “The Voice of Rigor,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: 
Practice in Christianity, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2004), 
174-175. 
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judge others."18 Kierkegaard thought his own life was insufficient to be an example, so he 
used Anti-Climacus to give the world an example of what it is to be one of faith.  
IV. Indirect Communication and the Pseudonyms 
 
Although the authors of Fear and Trembling and Practice in Christianity are 
Johannes de Silentio and Anti-Climacus, respectively, Kierkegaard was the editor of 
Practice in Christianity and wrote Point of View under his own name. Kierkegaard penned 
all the words, so why did he cloak his authorship in pseudonyms, and why these particular 
names? Part of the answer to this was gestured to in the final paragraph of the previous 
section; now I would like to give a more systematic explanation.  
Kierkegaard tells us that “[i]f anyone wants to have anything to do with this kind 
of communication, he will have to untie the knot himself.”19 To answer these questions, 
we must first untie the knot of indirect communication.  
The pseudonymous works are given in a language of “reflection,” indirect 
communication. Kierkegaard defines indirect communication as “to deceive into the 
truth.”20 All of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings are “maieutic.”21 The term 
originates from the Greek word, maieutikós, which means “midwife.” George Pattison 
explains, “He [Kierkegaard] was repeatedly to allude to Socrates' 'maieutic' approach to 
teaching, that is, being the midwife who brings others' thoughts to birth."22 These maieutic 
writings having a religious goal, which is “becoming a Christian.”23 Kierkegaard says in 
                                                
18 Hannay, Kierkegaard, 374.  
19 Kierkegaard, Practice, 133. 
20 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 7.  
21 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 7.  
22 Pattison, Kierkegaard, 78. 
23 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 8. 
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Point of View that there is evidence for this goal from the beginning to the end of his 
pseudonymous writings. In The Point of View Kierkegaard goes through the corpus 
pointing out how the religious is there from the beginning and becomes more pronounced 
further in the corpus. Kierkegaard says a shift in the intended audience accompanies the 
shift to the religious. Early in the corpus, the intended audience is Danish society as a 
whole, “the crowd” or “the public.”24  Gradually, it shifts to “the individual.”25 What this 
means is that Kierkegaard is speaking to persons in society in order to induce them to 
think of their own individual responsibility rather than society’s overall responsibility.  
Kierkegaard’s overall purpose is to deceive his readers into recognizing for 
themselves that Christendom is an illusion. Christendom is what Kierkegaard calls the 
Danish church, the national church of Denmark. The Danish people were by default 
“Christians” because of their nationality. Louis Mackey describes the state of Denmark in 
Kierkegaard’s day as being in “the illusion by which people who are in fact pagans 
persuade themselves that they are Christian.”26 In his journals, Kierkegaard refers to 
Christendom as “a monstrous illusion.”27 The people of Denmark were asleep to the fact 
that Christendom was an illusion.   
Kierkegaard uses pseudonyms to awaken the Danish people to the illusion of 
Christendom. Kierkegaard used this literary tool to do more than just conceal his identity. 
His pseudonyms present points of view or positions about a variety of topics such as God, 
society, reason, authority and faith. Kierkegaard had different purposes for different 
                                                
24 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 11.  
25 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 11.  
26Louis Mackey, Points of View: Readings of Kierkegaard (Tallahassee: University 
Presses of Florida, 1986), 180.  
27 Pattison, Kierkegaard, 70.  
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pseudonyms. In general, however, Kierkegaard uses them to communicate indirectly to his 
readers.  
The purpose of indirect communication is to to deceive the reader into thinking 
what the writer intended without allowing the reader to know his/her conclusions are 
intended by the writer. This is opposed to direct communication where one speaks to the 
audience openly and clearly about what one wants to say.  
Kierkegaard believed that one who is caught up in the illusion of Christendom 
cannot be brought out of this dilemma through direct communication: only indirect 
communication will be able to accomplish this task. Those who are caught up in this 
illusion have to be deceived into realizing they are living in an illusion. Kierkegaard 
explains this method of deception:  
One does not begin… in this way: I am Christian, you are not a Christian – 
but this way: You are a Christian, I am not Christian. Or one does not begin 
in this way: It is Christianity that I am proclaiming, and you are living in 
purely esthetic categories. No, one begins this way: let us talk about the 
esthetic.28 
 
Kierkegaard borrows heavily from Socrates’ concept of “midwifery” to explain his 
method of indirect communication.29 The pseudonyms are a type of midwife, replacing 
Kierkegaard as the author.30 They help the reader give birth to his or her own ideas 
because the author provides authority, context and purpose for the reader in a piece. 
Rather than looking to Kierkegaard as the author, the reader looks to the pseudonym and 
                                                
28 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 54.  
29 Kierkegaard goes as far as to say in Point of View, “I can very well call Socrates my 
teacher” (Point of View, 54).  
30 Midwives are by definition persons who assist in the birth of a child. They are the ones 
who replace Kierkegaard as the one assisting in the birthing of the reader’s ideas.  
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comes to conclusions that Kierkegaard intended though the reader is not supposed to 
realize that Kierkegaard’s intent was for him/her to come to these conclusions.  
Malantschuk documents the origin of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms. He compares 
Kierkegaard’s method of pseudonyms to being an actor. “It is of essential importance for 
an actor to be able to identify himself with the person he is to present if a rendering of the 
person’s psychical life is to be achieved.”31 If Daniel Day Lewis is to play a persuasive 
performance of Lincoln, then he must, on some level psychologically identify with 
Lincoln.32 Malantschuk explains that Kierkegaard used a method of “identification of the 
observer [Kierkegaard] with the object of the observations [his pseudonyms].”33 As a 
result of identifying with his pseudonym, Kierkegaard splits himself between his 
pseudonym and his own self. It allows Kierkegaard to be able to develop different 
attitudes and positions about life that become pseudonyms. This process is personal, as all 
acting is, but there is a separation between Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms. Kierkegaard 
in his journal calls himself a “double-thinker” who splits “I” into two. Malantschuck 
explains this concept:   
There is a first origin ‘I’ and ‘another’ which comes out in his empathetic 
experiments. Every time the ‘other I’ thinks something through, the ‘first I’ 
discovers that it also bears upon itself, because the relived character 
situation is one of his own possibilities, which thus becomes a present 
possibility for him.34  
 
                                                
31 Gregor Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought (Princeton University Press, 1971), 30. 
32 In one sense Kierkegaard is applying method acting, before it was practiced on the 
screen and on the stage, to writing.   
33 Malantschuk, Kierkegaard’s, 29.  
34 Malantschuk, Kierkegaard’s, 31. 
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Kierkegaard’s view is not the same as his pseudonym’s point of view. The 
pseudonyms develop their own point of view though they have an effect on 
Kierkegaard’s point of view since they stem from him.  
V. Objections 
 
The secondary scholarship on Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication is 
rather large. Henning Fenger says, “It is an accepted tenet of Kierkegaard scholarship that 
scholars must be required to make up their minds about the pseudonyms, the pseudonyms’ 
relations to one another and their connection to Kierkegaard himself.”35 Before moving 
into my own view on Point of View, I wish to provide a short overview of the Kierkegaard 
scholarship.  
There are two main perspectives on Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms.36 First are those 
who take Kierkegaard at his word in Point of View. This perspective can be traced in 
English-speaking scholarship back to Walter Lowrie who claimed that we can take 
Kierkegaard at his word and interpret Point of View as Kierkegaard’s own voice.37 Gregor 
                                                
35 Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard, the Myths and their Origins: Studies in the 
Kierkegaardian Papers and Letters (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 21.  
36 This overview is an adaption of a footnote in Jolita Pon’s work Stealing the Gift: 
Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms and the Bible (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 
160-161, footnote 86. 
37 Walter Lowrie says, “The Point of view for my Life as an Author is an intimate and 
sincere revelation of Søren Kierkegaard.” Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1938), 437.  
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Malantschuk,38 Stephen C. Evans,39 George Pattison,40 M. Holmes Hartshorne41 and 
others espouse similar views. Though each accepts Kierkegaard’s words in Point of View 
in different degrees, each accepts Kierkegaard’s fundamental claims in Point of View.  
On the opposite end is the view that we should take nothing at Kierkegaard’s word 
in Point of View. Everything “Kierkegaard” says is fabricated and deceptive. All claims in 
Point of View warrant suspicion and doubt. Henning Fenger would be the most extreme on 
this end.42 Others, like Joakim Garff43 and Louis Mackey,44 take a more moderate thesis 
                                                
38 Malantschuk says, “Kierkegaard’s method of making his writings difficult succeeded so 
well that he eventually feared that in studying his authorship people would stop with this 
multiplicity of individual works without discovering that the whole should be understood 
within a ‘comprehensive plan’ [total-anlaeg] which puts the individual works in place in 
relation to each other. To prevent anyone in the future from explaining the dissimilarity of 
the works simply by the ‘poor comment that the author changed’ and ‘to insure a 
comprehensive view of work,’ Kierkegaard drafted in 1848 The Point of View for my 
Work as an Author” (Kierkegaard’s, 5).  
39 Evans says, “I begin by affirming that I agree with Kierkegaard himself that his 
literature has an overall religious purpose and that Kierkegaard was, as he put it in The 
Point of View for my Work as an Author, ‘from beginning to end a religious author.’” C. 
Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical 
Fragments (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 4.  
40 Pattison says “The Point of View which… has an attractive simplicity, corresponding to 
its intention to explain Kierkegaard’s work as an author to his contemporaries at large” 
(Kierkegaard, 70). 
41 Hartshorne says, "These books are not by Kierkegaard at all… There is no doubt that 
Kierkegaard set pen to paper and that these books were among the resulting production." 
M. Holmes Hartshorne, Kierkegaard: Godly Deceiver (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990) 1. 
42 Jolita Pons in regards to Fenger’s position says, “Fenger seeks to prove that nothing in 
The Point of View should be taken at face value, that everything in it is consciously 
counterfeited and fabricated” (Stealing a Gift, 159). 
43 Garff says “when one begins summarizing Kierkegaard’s writing one quickly learns that 
its essence disappears because it is intimately connected with the fine ether of the the 
rhetoric, and in a summary it therefore evaporates.” Joakim Garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A 
Biography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 336. 
44 Mackey says, “This book is not the point of view for his work as an author. It is only a 
point of view… a plurality of wholes and no totality.” (Points of view, 190) 
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than Fenger, but they all doubt that what Kierkegaard says in Point of View can be taken at 
face value.  
My approach will be similar to that of the first group. I take it that Kierkegaard 
was being honest and in general accurate in Point of View. My goal is to explore the 
implications of this view. This approach is similar to Malantschuk’s in Kierkegaard’s 
Thought. Malantschuk assumes that there is an underlying principle to the Kierkegaardian 
corpus and that one can make legitimate claims about what Kierkegaard thought.45 This 
assumption requires an acceptance of Kierkegaard’s main claims in Point of View.  
This approach is subject to major criticism. I wish to deal with three such 
criticisms here. The first objection is the general claim that given specific events in his 
life, Kierkegaard’s (not the pseudonym “Kierkegaard”) real thought is found in his 
pseudonyms. This is what I will call the “biographical objection.” The second objection is 
that the supposed unified whole to the Kierkegaard “canon” is an invention. Kierkegaard 
had no idea what he was doing and made it up afterwards. This is what I will call the 
“invention objection.”  The third and final objection I shall confront here is that we cannot 
know what the unified system underlying Kierkegaard's works is. The “Kierkegaard” of 
Point of View is just another pseudonym and we can have no knowledge of what the “real 
Kierkegaard” intended. This is what I will call the “pseudonym objection.”  
A. The Biographical Objection 
 
M. Holmes Hartshorne works through the biographical objection in his work.  He 
defends the claim that we can use Point of View as a way of interpreting Kierkegaard’s 
writings in his work Kierkegaard: Godly Deceiver. Hartshorne explains that the 
                                                
45 See footnote 38.  
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biographical objection says that we can read the corpus biographically. Explaining the 
corpus from points of view other than Kierkegaard’s is misleading. Point of View is 
inaccurate because it leaves out important events in his life, and Kierkegaard’s method of 
indirect communication warps how personal Kierkegaard’s writings are.46 
For instance, reading Kierkegaard’s personal life into Fear and Trembling 
enhances one’s understanding of the work. Kierkegaard began his torrent of writing just 
after his heart-breaking decision to end his engagement with Regine Olsen.47 The two met 
before Regine was of age. Their first meeting made a strong impression on Kierkegaard, 
and he proposed a few years later when Regine was 18. Both seemed happy at the 
prospect of living life together. Kierkegaard’s sudden decision was unexpected and 
heartbreaking to Regine and her family. Regine’s father pleaded with Kierkegaard to 
reconsider, warning the young man that Regine was contemplating suicide. Kierkegaard in 
turn wrote harsh letters to Regine which he backed up with public displays of coldness 
toward her. All of this was to prove to her that their relationship was over. Yet, in his 
journals, Kierkegaard displays a deep love for her and sorrow over the ending of their 
engagement. He says he broke up with her primarily for her own sake. He believed that 
his constant brooding, melancholia and difficult relationship with her father might “crush 
her.”48  
                                                
46 Hartshorne, Kierkegaard, 74-80. 
47 The relationship between Regine Olsen and Søren Kierkegaard is one of the famous 
break-ups in western history. It has been scrutinized and discussed ever since it happened. 
Since it is not directly related to my research, I have not included the key works produced 
in this area of Kierekgaardian scholarship.  
48 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition trans. Howard H. Hong and Edna H. 
Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1843/1983), xiii. 
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Using this significant event in Kierkegaard’s life, the biographical objection says 
the break-up with Regine informed Kierkegaard’s early writings and was part of the 
impetus for writing Fear and Trembling. Hong & Hong in their introduction to Fear and 
Trembling say, “Kierkegaard was well aware…that one reader would inevitably use a 
biographical approach to whatever he wrote, for she was a part of that personal history.”49 
In Fear and Trembling Johannes de Silentio struggles with the question of whether a 
person may break an ethical duty for a higher duty that transcends “the universal.” 
Biographically, Hartshorne says Kierkegaard was ethically “bound by his commitment to 
Regine; he had confessed his love to her, asked for her hand and pledged his word.”50 But 
then he went and broke his word. His actions were justified only if he was living for a 
principle that is higher than ethics. 
 Hartshorne also points out other works, specifically, Either/Or and Repetition 
where, similar to Fear and Trembling, the reading of the work is enhanced with 
knowledge of the couple’s break-up.51 In regard to Either/Or, Hartshorne goes as far as to 
say, “Kierkegaard clearly had in mind his experience with Regine.”52 He admits, “Like 
any author, he [Kierkegaard] necessarily wrote out of his own experience.”53  
                                                
49 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, xi. 
50 Hartshorne, Kierkegaard, 75.  
51 Providing examples of how the readings of Either/Or and Repetition are enhanced 
through knowledge of Kierkegaard’s breakup with Regine is beyond the scope of this 
paper. But Hartshorne says “In the period when he wrote and published Either/Or, Fear 
and Trembling and Repetition, the suffering occasioned by his unhappy love was certainly 
uppermost in his mind…Regine was indeed central to these early writings” (Kierkegaard, 
77-78).  
52 Hartshorne, Kierkegaard, 77.  
53 Hartshorne, Kierkegaard, 77. 
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Hartshorne agrees with the biographical objection by saying that it is clear that the 
historical figure of Kierkegaard intentionally included his personal life in his writings. 
Kierkegaard did not try to hide the fact that his life was personally involved. This is 
evident from various journal entries.54 For example:  
It is true that when I began as an author I was “religiously resolved,” but 
this must be understood in another way. Either/Or, especially “The 
Seducer’s Diary,”[55] I wrote for her sake, in order to clear her out of the 
relationship. On the whole the very mark of my genius is that Governance 
broadens and radicalizes whatever concerns me personally.56 
 
The Kierkegaard of Point of View did not say that his writings are non-
biographical or void of his personal life. So admitting that biographical details will 
enhance one's reading of Kierkegaard’s works is not in tension with taking Point of View 
as a guide. Also, the pseudonyms are crucial because they help the reader see that what is 
being said is coming from a specific point of view not being held consistently by 
Kierkegaard or other pseudonyms. For instance, Johannes comes from the point of view of 
one who lacks faith in Fear and Trembling and who is criticizing Danish society for their 
belief they have faith because they really do not.   
                                                
54 In an entry from 1843, Kierkegaard wrote a rough outline of Fear and Trembling. At 
the end he notes “He who has explained this riddle has explained my life. But who of my 
contemporaries has understood this” (Journal: V 5640 Pap. IV A 76)? 
55 For those less familiar with Kierkegaard’s writings, “The Seducer’s Diary” is a chapter 
in Either/Or. Either/Or is the first pseudonymous work in the Kierkegaardian Corpus and 
is a 2 vol. book that provides a perspective of the life of a hedonist (the aesthetic point of 
view) that eventually gives way to one who lives a moral life (the ethical point of view). 
In “The Seducer’s Diary” Johannes the Seducer writes about his attempt to seduce a 
young woman by deceiving her into becoming engaged. When he gets what he wants from 
her, he breaks off the engagement in order to fight off “the boredom” that arises once he 
has met his goal.  
56 Journal: X.1 A 266.  
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B. The Invention Objection 
 
As noted above, the invention objection says that the supposed unified whole to 
the Kierkegaard “canon” is an invention. Kierkegaard had no idea what he was doing and 
made it up afterwards.  
This idea is advocated by Henning Fenger in Kierkegaard, the Myths and their 
Origins. In it he says there is a “darker” Kierkegaard than the one the majority of 
Kierkegaardian scholarship has focused on. Using source criticism, Fenger says that 
Kierkegaard made up the idea of a Kierkegaardian canon.57 Kierkegaard was really a 
psychologically sick man who spent his life working to fulfill his masochistic desires.58  
Point of View is a “blend of a desire for honesty and its naïve self-persuasion.”59 
On the one hand, Fenger recognizes that the writer of Point of View is the historical figure 
of Kierkegaard making an honest attempt at explaining the whole of his work. Hence, 
Fenger recognizes Kierkegaard’s role as a poet, who “has every right to… let himself be 
made into literature by Providence or God.”60  
On the other hand, Fenger says that Kierkegaard’s honest attempt to make sense of 
his own life is wrong. He says that we know it is wrong because there are factual 
                                                
57 Fenger says “If this little book has a thesis, it is simply that Kierkegaard research went 
down the wrong track at the outset and that ‘the mistake’ to a certain extent – to a great 
extent – goes back to Kierkegaard himself. But, like anyone else, of course, Kierkegaard 
had the right to suppress, rewrite, misrepresent, distort, erase, destroy and lead astray and 
to arrange the interpretation of his life and his works” (Kierkegaard, the Myths, xiii).  
58 Fenger says “During his final years of his life an enormously strong masochism recurs: 
his aggression is now not only directed outward but is self-destructive” (Kierkegaard, the 
Myths, 70).  
59 Fenger, Kierkegaard, the Myths, 29.  
60 Fenger, Kierkegaard, the Myths, 31. 
  
18 
inaccuracies in Kierkegaard’s journals.61 Furthermore, Kierkegaard manipulated 
information by portraying facts in a misleading way.62 Ever since then, scholars of 
Kierkegaard have been led down a false trail of interpreting Kierkegaard’s work, and my 
efforts would be no better off.  
However, Hartshorne offers a helpful response to Fenger. At the beginning of his 
writing, Kierkegaard did not have a clear plan for his writings, but as he wrote, the plan 
began to evolve. “Kierkegaard knew what he was doing when he wrote them, but he did 
not see clearly the overall plan of his literary activity until he had written much more.”63 
Kierkegaard says this in Point of View: “This is how I now understand the whole. From 
the beginning I could not quite see what has indeed also been my own development.” 
Kierkegaard did not begin with a clear picture in mind. Certain inaccuracies and 
manipulations were caused by Kierkegaard’s developing plan.   
 A second point to note is that Fenger’s analysis has major gaps. Multiple reviews 
of Fenger’s thesis have repeatedly pointed out that most of Fenger’s claims lack 
substantial evidence.64 Fenger admits a leaning toward Kierkegaard’s “aesthetic works” 
                                                
61For instance, Fenger explains that Kierkegaard mentions the “long passage of time” 
between the publishing of two articles though in actuality it had been only a month 
(Kierkegaard, the Myths 1). Fenger then goes through and shows that Kierkegaard’s 
“legendary memory is not precise about details” (Kierkegaard, the Myths, 1).  
62 For instance, Kierkegaard claims to have put the aesthetic authorship behind him after 
Postscript in 1845 but fails to mention A Literary Review: Two Ages, which was published 
in 1846, a work Fenger thinks is an aesthetic work (Kierkegaard, the Myths, 28-29).  
63 Hartshorne, Kierkegaard, 80.  
64 See George Stengren, Review of Kierkegaard, the Myths and Their Origins, by 
Henning Fenger, Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter No. 9, 1982, 8-11; Kerry J. Koller, 
Review of Kierkegaard, the Myths and Their Origins. By Henning Fenger, Notre Dame 
English Journal, 14 (2), 1982, 161–163; or Northrup Dunning, Review of Kierkegaard, 
the Myths and Their Origins by Henning Fenger, Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, 50(1), 1982, 141–142. 
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and consciously leaves out parts of Kierkegaard’s corpus. In the preface, Fenger says “[I] 
[l]et others map the whole of the Kierkegaard continent. My own ambitions will be richly 
fulfilled if I can delineate certain contours of the province which bears the name 
Aesthetica kierkegaardiana.”65 So Fenger’s criticism is dampened by the fact that he is 
focusing on only the aesthetic portions of Kierkegaard’s work.66 On the other hand, my 
paper is categorically different the Fenger’s project. My paper focuses on comparing a 
religious work with an aesthetic work. Fenger’s scope is focused only on aesthetic works 
and does not take into account the religious point of view found in the Kierkegaardian 
corpus.   
C. The Pseudonym Objection 
 
Lastly, the “pseudonym objection” is put forward by Louis Mackey. He argues that 
there is no unified whole and that the “Kierkegaard” of Point of View is just another 
pseudonym. Consequentially, we cannot have knowledge of what Kierkegaard actually 
thought. 
Before moving into Mackey’s objection in more depth, it’s important to be aware 
of how the Kierkegaardarian corpus is divided. The Kierkegaard corpus can be broken up 
into three “stages.” Each stage represents a view of the world and does not necessarily 
follow Kierkegaard’s personal life. The first stage is the aesthetic stage which focuses on 
self-gratification and living a hedonistic lifestyle. The aesthete follows the latest fashion 
and is constantly warding off boredom. The second stage is the ethical stage which 
                                                
65 Fenger Kierkegaard, the Myths, xi. 
66 Aesthetic works include Either/Or, Concluding Unscientific Postscript and Stages on 
Life’s Way while religious works would include The Sickness unto Death, Works of Love 
and Practice in Christianity. Aesthetic works come from the aesthetic stage whereas 
religious works come from the religious stage.  
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focuses on duty and living a moral life. The ethical life follows the laws and rules of 
“God, country or mankind in general.” The last stage is the religious stage which is broken 
up into Religiousness A and Religiousness B. Religiousness A is when the individual 
senses great guilt in the presence of God and has a strong sense of God’s immanence. 
Religiousness B is the conversion to being a follower of Christ through faith.67 One 
becomes “in Christ.” These three categories stem from Kierkegaard’s work Stages of 
Life’s Way and should not be taken as authoritative over all of Kierkegaard’s works. They 
provide helpful structure but break down in various works like Point of View.68  
According to Mackey, Point of View does not provide readers with the correct 
interpretation of Kierkegaard’s “canon,” but is only another “religious work.” Kierkegaard 
didn’t intend this: “he had outsmarted himself.”69 Consequently, there is “no totality”70 of 
works to understand in the Kierkegaardian corpus. The reason for Mackey’s claim is that 
Point of View has a high level of duplicity and leaves the reader with reasonable doubt 
about whether this is really Kierkegaard’s thinking. It is better to understand the work as 
another ironic piece written by another of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms.  
                                                
67 Merold Westphal in “Kenosis and Offense: A Kierkegaardian Look at Divine 
Transcendence” distinguishes between two types of Religiousness B. The first is when one 
is “believing in the paradox” (37) of the God-man and the second is “the willingness to 
become his follower” (37). I have not followed Westphal in this distinction because it has 
to do more with comparing Anti-Climacus with a previous pseudonym, Johannes 
Climacus from Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Making this distinction is unnecessary 
when comparing Johannes de Silentio and Anti-Climacus’ view of faith since Johannes de 
Silentio is not even at the first kind of religiousness. 
68 This information was taken from: Storm, D. Anthony. D. Anthony Storm's Commentary 
on Kierkegaard. Available at http://www.sorenkierkegaard.org/. Retrieved January 19, 
2016.  
69 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 186.  
70 Mackey, Points of View, 190.  
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Mackey argues that there are two areas where Point of View shows its duplicity. 
The first area has to do with externalities to the text and the second area with the text 
itself.  
One external issue that shows that Kierkegaard was not being as direct as he 
claims in Point of View has to do with whether the work was to be published. Kierkegaard 
struggled to decide when to publish the work. It was written in 1849 and eventually one 
part of it was published in 1851. Not until after Kierkegaard’s death was the rest 
published.  Instead of directly writing and then publishing the work, Kierkegaard held it 
back and then only published part it. His indecision shows a lack of directness contrary to 
what he says in Point of View. A second external issue has to do with the place of Point of 
View in the Kierkegaardian corpus. It was intended to be the last work in the 
Kierkegaardian corpus, but it was not. Kierkegaard continued to publish until within a 
couple months of his death. So although Kierkegaard said it was the last of his works, he 
continued to write and publish. Based on these two points it might be argued that 
Kierkegaard was not being as direct as he claims in Point of View.  
Mackey also takes issue with Kierkegaard’s arguments. First, he doubts that 
Kierkegaard is communicating directly in Point of View. This is because it is possible to 
go through each of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic works and see a parallel religious work written 
under Kierkegaard’s own name:  
The directly religious was present from the very beginning; Two 
Upbuilding Discourses is in fact concurrent with Either/Or. And in order to 
safeguard this concurrence of the directly religious, every pseudonymous 
work was accompanied concurrently by a little collection of “upbuilding 
discourses” – until Concluding Postscript appeared, which poses the issue, 
which is the issue… of the whole authorship: becoming a Christian.71  
                                                
71 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 8.  
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This, says Kierkegaard, is evidence that he was a religious author from the 
beginning of his authorship. But Mackey offers three objections to Kierkegaard’s claim. 
First, this argument supports the conclusion that  Kierkegaard was wholly an aesthetic 
writer with no religious intent works just as well: for every religious work published, there 
is an aesthetic work. Mackey summarizes this objection saying:  
Why isn’t the assumption that he is an aesthetic writer the one that 
succeeds, the presupposition that explains the authorship as a whole? The 
privilege here awarded the religious reading does not appear to emerge 
inevitably from the mere perusal of the texts.72 
 
Second, Mackey argues that Two Upbuilding Discourses is not a religious work. 
Rather, it was Kierkegaard making reparations for his father’s sin and justifying his 
broken engagement with Regine. Thus, Mackey says, “It was necessary to make 
reparation for the father’s crimes: because the mother had been violated, woman (read: 
Regine) must be left intact, and because his father had defied God, the most practice 
perfect submission.”73 Kierkegaard’s father (Michael) expected his whole family would 
die before him because God’s wrath was upon him. He believed God's wrath was upon 
him because he had slept with Kierkegaard’s mother before they were married and cursed 
God while working as a shepherd in the countryside of Denmark. His prophecy was 
almost true because his second wife and almost all his children died before his own 
passing. Since Michael died before either Søren or Søren’s older brother Peter, Søren took 
it upon himself to pay penitence to God for what he took to be his father’s sin.  
                                                
72 Mackey, Points of View, 166. 
73 Mackey, Points of View, 169. 
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Mackey also gives reason to doubt that Kierkegaard was writing out of his 
devotion to God in Point of View, thus giving reason to think that Kierkegaard was being 
deceptive in this work. Kierkegaard claims in Point of View that he has a relationship with 
God that is a “happy love.”74 He finds more joy in his relationship with God than he found 
even in the work that consumed most of his life.75 Yet without God, he would not have 
been able to accomplish this work, for he would have been overwhelmed by the quantity 
of thoughts running through his mind. He describes it as one starving in the midst of 
plenty, as being “overwhelmed by wealth.”76 Only by being obedient to God was he able 
to accomplish his work. As a result, Kierkegaard claims it is through God that his work is 
unified.  
Mackey claims that God filled the void of the loss of his fiancé and the loss of his 
father. “God is Søren’s lover. Having renounced Regine and lost his father, he regains 
them both in God, who is both ‘he’ (the dead father) and lover/beloved (the rejected 
bride).” But he goes on, “But God is Søren’s lover?”77  
To answer this question, Mackey explains that Kierkegaard projects his 
relationship with Regine and his father into his relationship with God. Kierkegaard’s 
father loved him and as a result diligently taught him the faith of Christianity. Yet, he also 
passed on his melancholy, leaving Kierkegaard with no childhood. Likewise, God blessed 
Kierkegaard with his gift of thinking and ability to write. This leaves Kierkegaard with a 
deep desire to write, even to the extent that in order to fulfill this desire he is willing to 
                                                
74 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 71. 
75 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 74.  
76 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 75. 
77 Mackey, Points of View, 173.  
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forgo the necessities of life.  The break-up with Regine provided Kierkegaard the 
experiences that enabled him to become a poet. God gave Kierkegaard his purpose: to be a 
religious writer. Hence “a system of dualities recapitulated eternally [Regine and 
Kierkegaard’s father] in his reflective relationship with the living Father who 
writes/accepts his works.”78 Though Kierkegaard says that God is his lover, he is being 
deceptive because he is projecting his relationship with his father and former fiancé on 
God.  It’s not that Kierkegaard really loves God; rather it’s his love for his father and 
fiancé that drive his project.  
Since Point of View is a deceptive work, like Kierkegaard’s other works, it brings 
into doubt Kierkegaard’s claim to be speaking directly. Rather, it is another work of 
indirect communication. Thus, when Kierkegaard explains the whole of his work as being 
religious, it’s not intended to be understood directly. It’s an ironic claim. There is no 
“Kierkegaard,” it is another pseudonym.79 As a result, “the canon contravenes itself.” 
There is no overarching plan for Kierkegaard’s work.   So the irony is that there is no 
“Kierkegaard” as the Kierkegaard of Point of View claims and no overarching plan though 
the Kierkegaard of Point of View claims there to be.  
 As noted above, Mackey contends that one could say that the whole purpose of the 
Kierkegaardian corpus could be aesthetic, not religious. However, there are two problems 
with this claim. First, all the aesthetic works are in pseudonyms while most of the 
religious works are not. Hence Kierkegaard says, “The author was a religious author who 
for that reason never wrote anything aesthetic himself but used pseudonyms for all the 
                                                
78 Mackey, Points of View, 178. 
79 Mackey, Points of View, 187, 188. 
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esthetic works.”80 If the purpose of all the writings was aesthetic, it seems some aesthetic 
works ought to be written with Kierkegaard’s own name as the author. If Kierkegaard’s 
purpose was primarily aesthetic, then we should expect his works with his own name to 
have this purpose. Moreover, there is no reason for an aesthetic author to write religiously.  
Thus, we have reason to believe that Kierkegaard is a religious author who writes 
aesthetically.  
Moreover, Mackey’s analysis of how Kierkegaard’s relationship with his father 
and fiancé influence his writing is pure conjecture. Certainly Kierkegaard’s break-up with 
Regine and Kierkegaard’s relationship with his father are important influences on his 
life.81 Furthermore they are helpful in interpreting the Kierekgaardian corpus. Yet, there is 
no direct textual evidence for these biographical claims. Point of View is not even cited in 
this section of Mackey's paper even though it is Point of View that he is discussing. 
Rather, he takes snippets from Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard’s journals and Two 
Discourses at the Communion on Fridays to force through an implied meaning that 
doesn’t exist in the text of Point of View.  
It’s possible, though highly doubtful, that the Kierkegaard of Point of View is a 
pseudonym and thus that we can’t know what Kierkegaard really thought. Yet, the 
pseudonym, Kierkegaard, makes major claims about how to read the pseudonymous 
works of Kierkegaard, the person. Why not suppose these claims are true—direct 
communication—and see where this reading takes us?  
                                                
80 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 31.  
81 Malantschuk mentions “even with a cautious estimate of Kierkegaard’s or his 
pseudonymous authors’ statements about his childhood, it must be taken for granted that 
his father’s powerful influence was of decisive significance in develop the very aptitudes 
he needed as a thinker” (Kierkegaard’s, 13). 
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Chapter two leads us into Johannes’ point of view of faith and chapter three into 
Anti-Climacus’ point of view of faith. Then we shall discuss how the two are 
Kierkegaard’s conclusion.  
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Chapter 2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
With the contents of chapter one in mind, I will now explain Johannes’ view of 
faith in Fear and Trembling. The next chapter will explain Anti-Climacus’ view of faith in 
Practice in Christianity. This chapter and the next lay the foundation for the final chapter, 
explaining Kierkegaard’s view of faith. First I will describe who Johannes is and his 
position in the Kierkegaardian corpus. Then I will walk through Fear and Trembling, 
explaining Johannes’ view of faith.  
II. Johannes de Silentio 
 
In what follows I will discuss three key aspects to the pseudonym Johannes de 
Silentio. First, Johannes speaks of himself as having two identities: he is a poet and a 
dialectician. Yet he is a specific sort of poet and claims to not be a philosopher. Second, in 
the Kierkegaardian corpus Johannes is a transitional pseudonym. He is between the stage 
of the ethical and the religious; he has a bit of both the religious and ethical in him. Third, 
because Johannes is a transitional pseudonym, Johannes lacks faith and cannot understand 
the subject of Fear and Trembling, which is Abraham’s obeying God’s command to 
sacrifice Isaac, his only son, out of faith.  
A. Johannes’ Dual Identities 
 
In the original draft of Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard subtitled the work, “A 
poetic person who exists only among poets.”82 He changed the subtitle in the final draft to, 
“A Dialectical Lyric.” The original and revised subtitles reveal Johannes’ dual identities as 
a poet and a dialectician.  
                                                
82 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 123.  
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Early in Fear and Trembling, Johannes claims to be “poetice et eleganter,”83 
which means “in a poetic and refined way.” Johannes is a poet in the sense that he is 
committed to the idea of Abraham’s faith as being true for himself but does not live it out. 
Johannes describes a poet:  
He [the poet] follows his heart’s desire, but when he has found the object of 
his search, [the hero,] he roams about to every man’s door with his song 
and speech so that all may admire the hero as he does, may be proud of the 
hero as he is.84 
 
 The poet praises the hero by collecting facts about the hero and retelling the hero’s 
story. According to Johannes, the poet is unable to do what the hero does and can only 
admire the hero. Hence, Johannes says, “Just as God created man and woman, so he 
created the hero and the poet or orator. The poet or orator can do nothing that the hero 
does; he can only admire, love, and delight in him.”85  
 As a poet, Johannes admires and delights in Abraham and his faith in Fear and 
Trembling. He calls Abraham “venerable Father Abraham”86 for his act of faith. 
Repeatedly, Johannes says he “admires” 87 Abraham.  
But Johannes is a poet who stops short of faith. Edward F. Mooney explains that 
Johannes “wants a truth by which he can live, that speaks directly, individually to him.”88 
He wants a truth that impacts him personally; he is committed to the idea that Abraham’s 
                                                
83 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 243. 
84 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 15. 
85 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 15. 
86 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 22. 
87 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 112, 114. 
88 Edward F. Mooney, Knights of Faith and Resignation: Reading Kierkegaard’s Fear 
and Trembling (Albany: State University of New York, 1991), 24.  
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faith is personally true for himself, but Johannes says “I cannot make the movement of 
faith.”89 Johannes does not go as far as to act it out in his own life.  
 The first half of Fear and Trembling is in the poetic genre. There is an Exordium, 
a Eulogy and a Preliminary Expectoration.  An exordium is a part of a rhetorical exercise 
intended to introduce an issue and urge the reader forward,90 the eulogy is a praise of 
someone91 and an expectoration is “an outpouring of the heart.”92 But Johannes says he is 
not a poet. “I am not a poet.”93 This apparent contradiction is resolved by understanding 
that Johannes is not a poet in a different sense. He does not process information and ideas 
as a poet. After saying he is not a poet, Johannes goes on to say, “and I go at things only 
dialectically.”94 He thinks dialectically.  Clare Carlisle explains that dialectics “is a form 
of philosophical thinking: it involves reasoning – elucidation of the distinctions and 
connections between concepts, points of view or positions – and it appeals to the intellect 
rather than the imagination.”95 The second half of Fear and Trembling is dialectical with 
three “problemas,” or what Alastair Hannay calls “puzzles.”96 Johannes processes the 
                                                
89 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 34. 
90 Sharon Crowley, Ancient Rhetoric for Contemporary Students (New York: Pearson 
Longman, 2009), 295.  
91 Mooney translates “Eulogy on Abraham” specifically as “Speech in Praise of Abraham” 
(Knights of Faith, 14).  
92 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 343, footnote 2. 
93 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 90; see also 7, 9. 
94 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 90; see also 7, 9. 
95Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling: A Reader's Guide (New York: 
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 137. 
96 Alastair Hannay, “Homing in on Fear and Trembling,” In Kierkegaard’s Fear and 
Trembling: a Critical Guide. Ed. Daniel Conway (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 14. 
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Akedah intellectually, specifically three dilemmas that it poses which will be introduced 
later in this chapter.  
 Though Johannes is a dialectical thinker, he is not a philosopher. Johannes says, 
“The present author is by no means a philosopher.”97 What Johannes means by 
“philosopher” is someone who works at creating a complete and comprehensive system of 
ideas with an organized and clear method.98  
 The reason Johannes distances himself from being a philosopher is that he wants to 
avoid understanding Abraham’s faith as his Danish contemporaries do. Johannes thinks 
Danish society is following the current trend of philosophical thinking. Danish society has 
“gone beyond”99 faith by “transposing”100 it into conceptual form and grasping it in light 
of a system of thought. Mooney describes the system of thought in vogue as “a grandiose 
attempt to capture all matter, all life, all spirit, in an overarching conceptual structure. This 
structure would embody universal knowledge and truth.”101 Uncomfortable tensions such 
as paradoxes, absurdities and doubts are moderated within this system of thought. Mooney 
goes on to say that these uncomfortable tensions are “smoothed over or erased through 
clever intellectual ‘solutions.’”102  
                                                
97 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 7.  
98 In the Preface, Johannes describes the expectations of Danish society for writers: “in an 
age when an author who desires readers must be careful to write in such a way that his 
book can be conveniently skimmed during the evening-dinner nap, must be careful to look 
and act like that polite gardener’s handyman in Adresseavisen. [The Advertiser] who with 
hat in hand and good references from his most recent employer recommends himself to 
the esteemed public” (Fear and Trembling, 7-8).  
99 Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard's Concept of Faith. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdman's Publishing Company, 2014), 32. 
100 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 7.  
101 Mooney, Knights of Faith, 21. 
102 Mooney, Knights of Faith, 22. 
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 Johannes is a poet in the sense that he is praising and admiring Abraham’s faith, 
but he does not process the Akedah as a poet but as a dialectician. He processes the 
Akedah intellectually as a puzzle. On the other hand, Johannes is not a philosopher. He is 
not building a system of thought in an attempt to fit Abraham’s faith within a system.  
B. A Transitional Pseudonym 
 
Ryan Kemp correctly argues in “Johannes de Silentio: Poet or Faithless 
Aesthete”103 that Johannes is best understood as being in-between the ethical and religious 
stage in the Kierkegaard corpus; Johannes has both the religious and ethical in him.  
In chapter one, I explained how the Kierkegaard corpus is often broken up into 
three “stages.”104 The first stage is the aesthetic stage, when one lives a hedonistic life 
style and is focused on self-gratification. The second stage is the ethical stage when one 
lives a moral life and is focused on following one’s duty. The last stage is the religious 
stage which is broken up into Religiousness A and Religiousness B. Religiousness A is 
when the individual senses great guilt in the presence of God and has a strong sense of 
God’s immanence. Religiousness B is the conversion to being a follower of Christ through 
faith. One becomes a contemporary with the God-man.  
Johannes is religious in that he “understands”105 the requirements of faith. 
Johannes as a poet admires Abraham’s faith and as a dialectician thinks about the Akedah. 
Yet Johannes does not “have”106 faith. Johannes says, "Even if one were to render the 
                                                
103 Ryan Kemp “Johannes de Silentio: Religious Poet or Faithless Aesthete?,” 
Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms, Eds. K. Nun & J. Stewart (Burlington, NC: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2015), 143-159. 
104 See chapter one, page 22-23  
105 Kemp, “Johannes de Silentio,” 144. 
106 Kemp, “Johannes de Silentio,” 144. 
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whole of the content of faith into conceptual form, it would not follow that one had 
grasped faith, grasped how it came to it or how it came to one."107 Johannes sets out in 
Fear and Trembling to conceptualize faith as a dialectician. He does not set out personally 
to acquire faith; he only admires it as a dialectician. Kemp correctly believes the reason 
Johannes does not acquire faith is that he lacks courage. Kemp explains:  
In the end, what prevents de Silentio from possessing faith is a failure to 
muster a certain kind of 'courage.' Thus, having faith, as opposed to merely 
knowing about it, requires certain motivational conditions to be met.108  
 
Because Johannes lacks courage, he has what Kemp calls a level of “Socratic faith.”109 
Mooney holds a similar position to Kemp and says, “Johannes tries to write about faith 
from only a poetic standpoint of beholding. And he, failing, tries to live, to be, from that 
merely poetic standpoint.”110 Mooney is saying that Johannes is looking at Abraham and 
praising him, admiring him, but Johannes fails to act out this admiration in his own life.  
C. Johannes does not understand Abraham’s Faith 
 
Johannes greatly admires Abraham but does not have faith because he fails to have 
the courage to act it out in his own life. Consequently, Johannes fails to understand 
Abraham’s faith. He says:  
The tragic hero, who is the favorite of ethics, is the purely human; him I 
can understand, and all his undertakings are out in the open. If I go further, 
I always run up against the paradox, the divine and the demonic, for silence 
is both. Silence is the demon’s trap, and the more that is silenced, the more 
terrible the demon, but silence is also divinity’s mutual understanding with 
the single individual.111 
 
                                                
107 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 7.  
108 Kemp, “Johannes de Silentio,” 145. 
109 Kemp, “Johannes de Silentio,” 150. 
110 Mooney, Knights of Faith, 36. 
111 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 88.  
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When considering faith dialectically, Johannes finds that faith is paradoxical because he 
cannot rationalize faith. Consequently, his lack of courage to live out faith leads him to 
have an incomplete view of faith.  
III. Johannes’ view of Faith in Fear and Trembling 
 
Fear and Trembling can be broken up into two parts. The first section, which is 
Part One in this section, consists of the Exordium, Eulogy and the Preliminary 
Expectoration. These sections are poetic. The second section, which is discussed in Part 
Two of this section, consists of three “problemas” or “puzzles” that focus on the dilemma 
one faces when considering Abraham’s act.  
A. Part One 
 
1. Exordium 
 
Johannes begins Fear and Trembling by describing the current philosophical trend 
of Danish society toward system building. Danish society has “gone beyond”112 faith by 
“transposing it”113 into conceptual form and grasping it in light of a system of thought. All 
thought is captured within this system. Tensions are moderated within this system of 
thought.  
Johannes sets out in Fear and Trembling to show that “going further than faith”114 
or having a theoretical view of faith comes at the cost of losing faith. To the Danish 
people, faith is an intellectual activity restricted to conversations and intellectual exercises 
                                                
112 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 32. 
113 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 7. 
114 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 7. 
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that have no bearing on how one lives. He compares his Danish contemporaries with 
“those of ancient days.”115 Back then faith was:  
A task for a whole lifetime, because it was assumed that proficiency in 
believing is not acquired either in days or in weeks. When the tried and 
tested oldster approached his end, had fought the good fight and kept the 
faith, his heart was still young enough not to have forgotten the anxiety and 
trembling that disciplined the youth…. The point attained by those 
venerable personages is in our age the point where everyone begins in 
order to go further.116  
 
Faith has become an intellectual activity that, paradoxically, eschews living faith 
out in one’s life. For instance, Johannes mentions sarcastically in the preface that many 
people want books written so that they can “be conveniently skimmed during the after-
dinner nap.”117 Faith is a matter limited to conversation and arm-chair thinking in Danish 
society—people no longer lived faith out in their lives. 
Johannes wants to challenge the Danish people’s merely theoretical view of faith. 
To do so, he uses the same methods of rationality used by the Danish people, but he uses 
them to analyze the Akedah. As we will see, this method of rationality results in faith 
being a paradox. In four Exordiums or introductions, he presents the Akedah. The story is 
that the Lord tells Abraham that he and Sarah, his wife, will have a son in spite of their old 
age. Abraham believes God, and they have a son who is named Isaac. God then tells 
Abraham to sacrifice Isaac as a burnt offering to God on Mt. Moriah. Abraham works to 
carry out God’s command, but at the last moment, an angel of the Lord stops Abraham 
from killing his son and provides a ram as a substitute sacrifice.  
                                                
115 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 7. 
116 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 7. 
117 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 8. 
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In each Exordium Johannes uses creative license to interpret what might have 
happened if Abraham had lacked faith.118  In each Exordium he concludes that Abraham is 
so great that no one, not even he, Johannes, can understand him: “No one was as great as 
Abraham. Who is able to understand him?”119 asks Johannes. Johannes explains what it 
means to say that Abraham is the greatest in “Eulogy on Abraham.” 
2. Eulogy120 
 
 “Greatness” to Johannes is defined by how one relates to God. Johannes sees 
Abraham to be “the greatest of all”121 people. Abraham’s relationship with God makes 
him the greatest because he “struggled with God”122 and “conquered God by his 
powerlessness.”123 What Johannes means when he says that Abraham “conquered God” is 
that Abraham won God’s favor and blessing. Abraham won God’s favor and blessing by 
his, Abraham’s, “powerlessness.”124 This means that Abraham gave up Isaac to God but 
had faith that God would return Isaac to him.  
Johannes describes Abraham’s faith in these terms: “It is great to lay hold of the 
eternal, but it is greater to hold fast to the temporal after giving it up.”125 The temporal is 
the realm of this world. This includes personal wealth and relationships with other people. 
                                                
118 Mooney says that each prelude “presents a striking quartet of variations on the 
Abraham story. Each variation highlights, by what it omits, an essential feature [faith] of 
the faithful version of the story” (Knights of Faith, 14). Mooney says later that in each of 
these descriptions that essential feature is faith (Knights of Faith, 28). 
119 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 14. 
120 Johannes is using this term not to refer specifically to praise of someone who has died 
but rather more narrowly, simply as praise of a person.  
121 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 16. 
122 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 16. 
123 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 16. 
124 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 16. 
125 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 18. 
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Johannes gives an example of the rich young man in the gospel of Luke as one who is not 
willing to give up the temporal. Jesus asks the rich young man to give away all his 
personal wealth to the poor and come follow him. The rich young man would not.126 
Johannes contrasts the rich young man with Abraham who has faith and gives up the 
temporal. Isaac is “the temporal” in the Akedah. To lay “hold of the eternal” means to give 
up the temporal which is what Abraham did when he attempted to sacrifice Isaac. Yet 
Abraham is great because he still held “fast to the temporal.” Johannes means that 
Abraham believed God would return Isaac to him though he gave up Isaac to God (the 
eternal).  
Speaking in his poetic stance, Johannes says he is “amazed”127 by Abraham, 
calling him “venerable father.”128 But Johannes says no one can understand Abraham and 
that his faith is “preposterous.” Faith to Johannes is a paradox. This becomes clearer in the 
“Preliminary Expectoration.”  
3. Preliminary Expectoration 
 
The title “Preliminary Expectoration” fits with Johannes’ identity as a poet. Hong 
and Hong note that the word “expectoration” means “an outpouring of the heart.” 129 
Walter Lowrie translates the title as “Preamble from the Heart.” 130 These different 
translations show how this is a section where Johannes is writing as a poet, expressing an 
issue of the heart.  
                                                
126 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 49; Luke 18:18-23.  
127 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 37. 
128 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 22. 
129 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, footnote 2, 343. 
130 Mooney, Knights of Faith, 14.  
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  In this expressive preamble, Johannes begins to explain the inherent paradox of the 
Akedah. Abraham is a man of faith, but he is also murdering his only son by God’s 
command. To make the paradox clear to his contemporaries, Johannes theorizes that if a 
Danish contemporary tried to carry out what Abraham did, he would be condemned as a 
murderer. “He probably would be executed or sent to the madhouse,”131 says Johannes, 
but “we glorify Abraham…”132 Johannes maintains that to the Danish people, the only 
morally relevant difference between Abraham and the mad Dane is that Abraham had 
faith. Obviously the mad Dane is mad, but why not Abraham asks Johannes?133 Using the 
methods of his contemporaries, Johannes wants to understand how faith can make an 
unethical act, murder, become an ethical act, even “holy.”134 Johannes struggles to 
reconcile the paradox that he sees in Abraham’s faith:  
I am constantly aware of the prodigious paradox that is the content of 
Abraham’s life, I am constantly repelled, and, despite all its passion, my 
thought cannot penetrate it, cannot get ahead by a hair’s breadth. I stretch 
every muscle to get a perspective, and at the very same instant I become 
paralyzed.135  
 
Johannes desires to understand faith but cannot become sufficiently courageous to “plunge 
confidently”136 into it. Consequently, he is thinking about faith from the point of view of 
                                                
131 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 29.  
132 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 28. 
133 This ethical question Johannes raises is interesting but not relevant to my overall thesis 
since my thesis is focused on comparing Johannes’ and Anti-Climacus’ view of faith to 
develop Kierkegaard’s view of faith.  
134 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 30. 
135 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 33. 
136 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 34. 
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one without faith. Mooney correctly says that Johannes is at a stage Johannes calls “a 
knight of infinite resignation.”137  
Johannes explains what a knight of infinite resignation is by using an example of a 
young man who falls in love with a princess whom he cannot marry. The young man’s 
love is deep, so when he discovers he cannot have her, the young man must resign himself 
to giving her up:  
Having totally absorbed this love and immersed himself in it, he does not 
lack the courage to attempt and to risk everything. He examines the 
conditions of his life, he convenes the swift thoughts that obey his every 
hint, like well-trained doves, he flourishes his staff, and they scatter in all 
directions. But now when they all come back, all of them like messengers 
of grief, and explain that is an impossibility, he becomes very quiet, he 
dismisses them, he becomes solitary, and then he undertakes the 
movement.138 
 
The young man renounces the possibility of marrying the princess but he 
“undertakes the movement” by continuing to love her eternally. He does not need to see 
her to maintain his love for her. Rather, by renouncing his love “in the finite world,” he is 
able to continue his love for her eternally. Johannes says that “he keeps his love just as 
young as it was in the first moment; he never loses it simply because he has made the 
movement infinitely.”139  
                                                
137 Mooney explicitly notes that Johannes is a knight of resignation (Knight of Faith, 54). 
Also, though Johannes and Danish society are working from the same point of view, this 
does not mean that Johannes thinks that the rest of Danish society is at the point of being 
knights of infinite resignation. He is clear in his description of Danish society as being 
cheap in how it treats ideas. “Not only in the business world but also in the world of ideas 
our age stages a real sale. Everything can be had at such a bargain price that it becomes a 
question whether there is finally anyone who will make a bid” (Kierkegaard, Fear and 
Trembling, 5).  
138 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 42. 
139 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 44. 
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One becomes a knight of infinite resignation through the following process. One 
begins to desire something so much that it becomes the sole focus of his life. One then 
becomes a knight of infinite resignation when one realizes that one will not get what one 
desires and one accepts the fact one will not get it. This acceptance is comforting and 
brings peace. One will have reconciled oneself to the reality that this is how things are. 
The virtue of peace or “eternal comfort” that is thereafter reflected in one stems from one's 
acceptance of this unfulfilled desire.  
Mooney gives good reasons for believing Johannes is a knight of infinite 
resignation. Mooney says that Johannes is a knight of infinite resignation because 
Johannes admits he could do part of what Abraham did on Mt. Moriah: he could sacrifice 
Isaac just like Abraham. But Johannes thinks that he would not be able to bring himself to 
expect, like Abraham did, to get Isaac back. “The moment I mounted the horse, I would 
have said to myself: Now all is lost, God demands Isaac, I sacrifice him and along with 
him all my joy…”140 Johannes’ surrender of Isaac to God would be an act of “immense 
resignation,” a “substitute for faith.”141 But Johannes would be at peace with losing his son 
Isaac.   
Johannes says that Abraham is at the stage of a knight of faith. A knight of faith is 
in contrast to the knight of infinite resignation because the former makes an extra 
movement that the knight of infinite resignation does not make. The knight of faith 
continues to hold on to the belief that he will marry the princess:  
He does exactly the same as the other knight did: he infinitely renounces 
the love that is the substance of his life, he is reconciled in pain. But then 
                                                
140 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 35. 
141 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 35. 
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the marvel happens; he makes one more movement even more wonderful 
than all the others, for he says: Nevertheless I have faith that I will get her – 
that is, by virtue of the absurd.142  
 
While recognizing the impossibility of the act, the knight of faith believes that the 
act will happen. According to Johannes, this kind of belief is faith and it is held by “virtue 
of the absurd.”143 It is absurd that the young man believes that he will get the princess 
though he is giving up the princess. Likewise, it is absurd that Abraham decides to accept 
losing Isaac and decides to believe that God will return Isaac to him in this lifetime. 
Johannes calls this “the double movement,”144 and he says that this extra step of faith that 
Abraham, a knight of faith, takes is “beyond human calculation.”145 This is the step that 
Johannes thinks that he cannot make: he can only observe Abraham and “describe the 
movements of faith.” In the second part of Fear and Trembling, Johannes works through 
three puzzles analyzing the Akedah and the paradox that it presents to him and his Danish 
contemporaries.  
B. Part Two 
 
Johannes leaves his poetic expression of faith and begins his dialectical thought in 
the second half of Fear and Trembling. He focuses on three questions: First, “Is there a 
teleological suspension of the ethical?” Second, “Is there an absolute duty toward God?” 
Third, “Is it ethically defensible for Abraham to conceal his undertaking from Sarah, from 
Eliezer and from Isaac?” I shall discuss each of these three questions in the next three 
subsections of this chapter.   
                                                
142 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 46. 
143 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 40. 
144 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 36. 
145 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 35, 36. 
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1. Problema I: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? 
 
In this section I will explain the first question and Johannes’ answer. First I define 
the ethical and explain what Johannes means by a “teleological suspension.” Then I show 
how Johannes looks at Abraham’s faith, resulting in an example of a “teleological 
suspension of the ethical.”  
 Johannes asks whether the “ethical” or “universal”146 applies at all times in light of 
the paradoxical knight of faith. Westphal defines the ethical as “the domain in which the 
laws and customs of one’s people are the highest norms for action. The ethical is the 
concrete universal, the community whose values sustain, guide, judge and reward the 
individual."147 Westphal goes on to explain that Johannes is defining the ethical through a 
particular view of reason. It is a type of reason that has “hegemony over interpretation” 
and leaves “no mysteries unresolved.”148 Westphal says that this view is a priori “in the 
Kantian sense except one finds great difficulty in justifying it.”149 Consequentially, 
anything that claims to go beyond reason is perceived as “absurd” or “madness” precisely 
by virtue of the fact that it goes beyond reason: if reason cannot comprehend it and if 
reason has ultimate authority over interpretation, then it is incomprehensible.150  
                                                
146 Johannes says later “The ethical is the universal…” (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 
68).  
147 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 94.  
148 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 86. 
149 Westphal explains that customs and cultural practices are “hard to construe as a 
condition of the possibility of experience. It is to adopt a prejudice in the Gadamerian 
sense, along with the realization that this places one in a hermeneutical circle that is but 
one option among others” (Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 86). I think what Westphal is 
trying to say is that customs of a people cannot be a priori.  
150 It’s worth mentioning that Clare Carlisle disagrees with Mooney and Westphal. In her 
commentary on Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: a Reader’s 
Guide  she argues that the ethical refers to Kant’s view (16-21). Also, in her paper, 
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 A “teleological suspension” is holding back an explanation for an action. All 
actions according to the universal must be explained in light of the “teleology of the moral 
[ethical].”151 If there is no explanation for an act within the ethical, then according to 
reason, it is absurd or a paradox. 
 The question that Johannes is asking is whether the ethical can explain faith, and 
the answer is that it cannot:  
The story of Abraham contains, then, the teleological suspension of the 
ethical. As the single individual he became higher than the universal. This 
is the paradox, which cannot be mediated. How he entered into it is just as 
inexplicable as how he remains in it.152 
 
Abraham’s act is madness or absurd because it suspends the ethical despite the fact 
that the ethical, according to the ethical, “applies at all times.” 153 Because of faith, one can 
suspend the ethical by not giving a reason for its action. Someone like Abraham is “mad” 
because his purpose is found in God rather than reason. This is what Johannes means 
when he says, “For he who loves God without faith reflects upon himself; he who loves 
God in faith reflects upon God.”154 C. Stephen Evans correctly notes that Johannes sees 
that a "person of faith is a person who has a direct and personal relationship with God, a 
                                                
“Johannes de Silentio’s Dilemma,” (2015) she argues that Kierkegaard would have been 
familiar with Kant’s critique of Abraham through lectures given by Hans Lassen 
Martensen who tutored Kierkegaard and later became bishop (48-51). Lastly, she says that 
Kant and Hegel shared similar views that the good life is best fulfilled in meeting ethical 
requirements. This may be true; the reason I differ with Carlisle is that the way Johannes 
goes about explaining the ethical is by saying that it resides in society or Hegel’s 
Sittlichkeit. The ethical is not really “universal” but only appears universal from the point 
of view of the ethical.  
151 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 54. 
152 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 66. Italics are my own.  
153 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 54. 
154 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 37. 
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relation that cannot be reduced to the individual absorbance of socially accepted ideals.”155 
Abraham has a direct relationship with God that is outside of society’s expectations, and 
society’s rules have no claim on him.  
Abraham suspends the ethical by a movement of faith, moving “higher than the 
universal.”156 This is a paradoxical “movement,” in which the individual (knight of faith) 
is not justified by the universal. To be justified in this sense is to have a sufficient 
explanation for an action. To flesh out the teleological suspension of the ethical, Johannes 
contrasts Abraham’s actions with the actions of a tragic hero.  
A tragic hero ends the life of a loved one, and his actions are justified by the 
universal. Johannes recounts the stories of Jephthah sacrificing his daughter, Brutus 
(Junius) executing his sons and Agamemnon sacrificing his daughter. The actions of these 
tragic heroes are within the universal and do not require faith because the universal gives 
justification for them. Jephthah vowed to God to sacrifice the first thing he saw come out 
of the doors of his home, which turned out to be his daughter and only child, in exchange 
for a military victory.157  Brutus had his two sons executed for their attempted overthrow 
of the Roman Republic.158 Agamemnon sacrificed Iphigenia to the gods so his ships could 
sail to Troy.159 Jephthah’s action was justified by the universal of Ancient Israel because 
he fulfilled his vow to the Lord. Brutus’ action was justified by the universal of Ancient 
Rome because he preserved the Republic. Agamemnon was justified by the universal of 
                                                
155 C. Stephen Evans, “Faith as the telos of Morality” In Kierkegaard on Faith and the 
Self: Collected Essays. (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2006), 23.  
156 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 55.  
157 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 58, 87. 
158 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 58. 
159 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 87. 
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ancient Greece because he was able to sail to Troy.  In these three cases, one working 
within the universal of that culture will see the justification for their actions.   
Johannes says, “It is not to save a nation, not to uphold the idea of the state that 
Abraham does it; it is not to appease the angry gods.”160 Unlike the tragic hero, Abraham’s 
actions are not justified within the universal. Hence, no one coming from the point of view 
of the universal can understand why Abraham is murdering his son. Mooney says:  
The tragic hero can count on being understood, even in the midst of his 
dilemma, because he can count on a large background, even in the midst of 
his dilemma, of socialized agreement about the relevant universal rules. 
However, a command from God, in Kierkegaard’s or Johannes’s view, is 
not a public, objective matter. It is utterly private.161  
 
Because Abraham’s act has no relation to the universal, the act is a “private 
endeavor,” 162 and Abraham cannot communicate the reason for his act within the 
universal. Johannes, who is within the universal, cannot explain the justification for this 
act either. If he tried to explain it, he would express the universal. “As soon as I speak, I 
express the universal, and if I do not do so, no one can understand me.”163 
The reason is that Johannes believes that in order for communication to work, it 
requires a set of rules to govern it. Because he is of the point of view of the ethical, the 
rules for his communication stem from the ethical. Abraham cannot use these rules to 
communicate his act since his act is separate from the ethical and to communicate would 
be using the rules of the ethical. Hence, Johannes thinks that Abraham’s act is purely “a 
private endeavor” between him and God. 
                                                
160 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 59. 
161 Mooney, Knights of Faith, 72.  
162 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 59. 
163 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 60. 
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Because of the teleological suspension of the ethical, Abraham is “the single 
individual or the self as the single individual [who] stands in an absolute relation to the 
absolute.”164 What this means is that Abraham as a single individual is not acting out of 
habit or as a member of a group or culture. He is self-consciously choosing to sacrifice 
Isaac. Abraham’s “absolute relationship” is one in which the relationship transcends the 
ethical norms of his society. The relationship is absolute in that regardless of anything 
else, Abraham’s relationship still stands with “the absolute.” The absolute is God who 
issued Abraham a command to sacrifice his son.  
From the point of view of the ethical, Abraham’s act is a paradox or absurd 
because the ethical cannot explain why Abraham sacrifices Isaac. Since the ethical cannot 
explain why Abraham sacrifices Isaac, this means that either there is a teleological 
suspension of the ethical or Abraham’s act warrants calling him a murderer and ought to 
be condemned.  
2. Problema II: Is there an Absolute Duty Toward God? 
 
Another question Johannes answers is whether there is an absolute duty toward 
God. Johannes concludes that “either there is an absolute duty to God… or else Abraham 
is lost.”165 We will first look at Johannes’ question and then his answer.   
 In asking this question, Johannes is not saying that “God” refers to the universal or 
duty. Otherwise, says Johannes, this would be a tautology. Contradicting Johannes’ point 
of view is the ethical point of view which says that God is the universal or duty. From the 
ethical point of view God is impersonal and abstract. Doing one’s duty is not entering into 
                                                
164 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 123. 
165 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 81. 
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a relationship with God but simply complying with an abstract code. However, in 
Johannes’ view, “God” is a personal being who issues commands and promises. Abraham, 
by obeying God, enters into this personal relationship since he is obeying a personal God. 
Clare Carlisle explains:  
In problem II, then, Johannes de Silentio is concerned to accentuate the 
contrast between an abstract conception of God as nothing more than the 
ethical-as-universal, and the personal God with whom the ‘knight of faith’ 
has an intimate and particular relationship. He states that the knight of faith 
attains a ‘wondrous glory… in becoming God’s confidant, the Lord’s 
friend, and to speak very humanly, in saying ‘you’ to God in heaven.’ [68] 
The second-person form of address – saying ‘you’ rather than saying ‘he’ 
or ‘she’ – represents the individual’s direct, personal relationship to God 
which is the content of religious faith, whereas ‘even the tragic hero 
addresses [God] in the third person.’ [68]166 
 
Abraham enters into this relationship through an internal disposition of faith. Faith 
is not in “the company of feelings, moods, idiosyncrasies, vapeurs [vagaries], etc.”167 It is 
different from other internal dispositions in that “faith is preceded by a movement of 
infinity.”168  
 One can see this movement in the tragic hero and knight of infinite resignation 
who resigns himself to a situation being guided by the universal, who is reconciled with 
his situation and does not expect anything back. 
Faith comes when one has the internal disposition of expecting to receive what was 
relinquished. A knight of faith goes further than the knight of infinite resignation. 
                                                
166 Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 122. Earlier I voiced my disagreement 
with how Carlisle characterizes the ethical in its connection with Kant. (See footnote 69.) 
Here, Carlisle and I agree that the ethical’s conception of God is one of an abstract being 
who is impersonal.  
167 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 69.  
168 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 69. 
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Johannes repeats himself from earlier by explaining that to expect what one gives up, the 
knight of faith “relates himself as the single individual absolutely to the absolute.”169 In 
light of what we said earlier about this statement, Johannes also adds that the knight of 
faith (Abraham) has a duty to God prior to his duty to the universal because he has faith, 
something which Johannes does not understand. Abraham consciously decides to sacrifice 
Isaac because God commanded him to do so. Johannes says that if one’s duty to God is 
prior to one’s duty to the universal, then one’s duty to the universal is relative. But a 
universal, by Johannes’ definition, is not relative, which is a contradiction. Johannes 
thinks that this contradiction cannot be resolved.  
 From the point of view of the universal, Abraham has an absolute duty per the 
universal to love and protect his son. On the other hand, the universal recognizes that 
Abraham believes that he has an absolute duty to sacrifice his son. This is a paradox 
according to Johannes since sacrificing one’s son is not protecting or loving one’s son. 
Johannes hypothesizes that if someone were to discuss with Abraham his dilemma then he 
would see this paradox:  
If he [Abraham] had said to someone: I love Isaac more than anything in 
the world and that is why it is so hard for me to sacrifice him – the other 
person very likely would have shaken his head and said: why sacrifice him, 
then? Or, if the other had been smart, he probably would have seen through 
Abraham and perceived that he was manifesting feelings that glaringly 
contradicted his actions.170  
 
Johannes thinks that this paradox cannot be resolved from the point of view of the 
universal. Furthermore, to try to do so is to cancel faith. “Faith itself cannot be mediated 
                                                
169 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 70. 
170 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 70. 
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into the universal, for thereby it is canceled...” 171 When the universal attempts to 
understand faith, it can understand it only as a paradox. The universal takes uncomfortable 
tensions like paradoxes and tries to smooth them over but to do so is to get rid of faith 
since, according to Johannes, faith is inherently contradictory.   
It is difficult to accept the paradox that exists between Abraham obeying God’s 
command and Abaham’s societal duty to love and protect his son. The reason it is difficult 
is that one within the universal cannot understand the knight of faith. Tragic heroes have 
the comfort of being understood by those around them. Tragic heroes are pitiable but 
relatable. To Johannes, the knight of faith is not relatable and is isolated:  
He [the knight of faith] also knows that up higher there winds a lonesome 
trail, steep and narrow; he knows it is dreadful to be born solitary outside of 
the universal, to walk without meeting one single traveler. He knows very 
well where he is and how he relates to men. Humanly speaking, he is mad 
and cannot make himself understandable to anyone.172 
 
Johannes claims that the reason for the knight of faith’s isolation from others is that he 
cannot receive outside help in his “task”173 of faith. This is because he is in an “absolute 
relationship with the absolute.” 174 For the knight of faith to receive help outside this 
“absolute relationship” is to act not in reference to this absolute relationship because this 
“absolute relationship” would then no longer be absolute.  
                                                
171 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 71. 
172 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 76. 
173 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 7. 
174 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 123. 
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 Johannes says that the knight of faith, in this case Abraham, is “mad.” Abraham 
had waited 130 years175 to have Isaac. Now, he was going to relinquish what God had 
given him. Johannes says, “Let me speak humanly about it, purely humanly!... Is it not 
madness!”176  From Johannes’ point of view, Abraham’s actions are mad because, after 
waiting for 130 years, Abraham is now giving up the promise of God by sacrificing Isaac.  
The origin for Johannes’ claim that Abraham is mad is his point of view as one 
from the universal or ethical. Similar to the first puzzle, Johannes cannot make sense of 
the reason for Abraham’s act because Johannes’ point of view is one from the universal or 
ethical. Consequently, he admires Abraham, as we said before, but finds his act to be mad.  
3. Problema III: Was it Ethically Defensible for Abraham to Conceal his Undertaking from 
Sarah, Eliezer and from Isaac? 
 
Johannes’ final question is, “Was it ethically defensible for Abraham to conceal his 
undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer and from Isaac?” To reiterate, Westphal defines the 
ethical as, “The domain in which the laws and customs of one's people are the highest 
norms for action. The ethical is the concrete universal, the community whose values 
sustain, guide, judge and reward the individual."177 The laws and customs in Abraham’s 
life are the relationships in his family: the husband-wife relationship (with Sarah), the 
master-servant relationship (Eliezer)178 and the father-son relationship (Isaac).  
                                                
175 Abraham was 100 years old (Genesis 21:5) when Isaac was born. Kierkegaard was 30 
years old when he wrote Fear and Trembling; perhaps a numerological point Kierkegaard 
was trying to make?  
176 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 77. 
177 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 94. 
178 Genesis 15:2. 
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Abraham conceals his undertaking from these people by remaining silent. At one 
point in the story, Isaac asks, “Where is the lamb for a burnt offering?” Abraham 
responds, “My son, God will provide himself a lamb for a burnt offering.”179 Johannes 
says that Abraham’s response is “in the form of irony, for it is always irony when I say 
something and still do not say anything.”180 What Johannes means is that while it is true 
that God was going to provide a lamb, Abraham did not specify who this lamb would be 
despite knowing that it would be Isaac. 
Johannes works through various examples, both historical and fictional, to show 
“the incomprehensibility”181 of Abraham’s act. In the end, Abraham is cloaked by silence, 
and onlookers are unable to understand. Abraham cannot explain his action because he 
would be explaining it in reference to the universal, which he cannot do since he is acting 
in faith. Abraham’s action, according to Johannes, cannot be explained because Johannes 
is coming from the point of view of the ethical.  
Abraham’s acting in faith shows that he had relinquished Isaac to God. Yet, he 
took the extra step of faith, and he believed that he would receive Isaac back because “it is 
indeed possible that God could do something entirely different.”182  
Johannes cannot understand Abraham and thinks of his action as a paradox. 
Johannes thinks that he himself has stopped short of faith because he does not have the 
courage to acquire faith. Nonetheless, he has not followed his own generation in failing to 
pursue faith.  
                                                
179 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 115-116; Genesis 22:8.  
180 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 118. 
181 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 112. 
182 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 119. 
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VI. Summary 
 
Johannes’ presentation of faith is incomplete. He says that faith is formed through 
a private relationship with God. One with faith is silent about this relationship from the 
point of view of one who is in the ethical. Also, Johannes understands faith dialectically. 
Because of his point of view, he does not understand the justification for Abraham’s 
action, and faith appears to be a paradox to him.  In the next chapter we will look at Anti-
Climacus’ account of faith in Practice in Christianity: being a contemporary of the God-
man and meeting the requirements of believing the God-man’s words and not being 
offended by him. After this second analysis I argue that from Johannes’ point of view and 
Anti-Climacus’ point of view it may be inferred that Kierkegaard’s view of faith is the 
aligning of the self in a trusting relationship with the God-man. Moreover, one outside of 
faith will perceive faith to be paradoxical or find faith offensive, for one must have faith to 
avoid offense and overcome this paradox.  
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Chapter 3 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I focus on Anti-Climacus’ point of view of faith in Practice in 
Christianity. I note some differences between Fear and Trembling and Practice in 
Christianity before discussing two reasons why Kierkegaard chose Anti-Climacus as the 
pseudonym for Practice in Christianity. Then I discuss Anti-Climacus’ point of view of 
faith as being a contemporary with the God-man and meeting the requirements of 
believing the God-man’s words and not being offended by the God-man.  
II. Major Differences between Practice in Christianity and Fear and Trembling 
 
Fear and Trembling is often said to be Kierkegaard’s most popular work, but 
Kierkegaard saw Practice in Christianity as his greatest work.183 There are major 
differences between Practice in Christianity and Fear and Trembling. Practice in 
Christianity is almost double the length of Fear and Trembling. Practice in Christianity 
begins with an invocation and ends with a series of homilies. Fear and Trembling is 
subtitled as “A Dialectical Lyric.” The first half is poetic, and the second half is 
dialectical.  
Another major difference between the two works is the shift in audience. 
Johannes’ audience is Danish society. The focus is on society as a whole group. By way of 
contrast, Anti-Climacus’ audience is “individuals.”184 An individual to Anti-Climacus is a 
                                                
183 In reflecting on Practice in Christianity Kierkegaard says in his journal, “Without a 
doubt it [Practice in Christianity] is the most perfect and truest thing I have written.” (Pap. 
X A 66) In regards to Fear and Trembling, he has this to say, “Once I am dead, Fear and 
Trembling alone will be enough for an imperishable name as an author. Then it will be 
read, translated into foreign languages as well” (Pap. X A 15).  
184 Kierkegaard, Practice, 14. 
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person who self-consciously chooses for himself.185 This is related to (and borne out by) 
another major difference between the two works: Kierkegaard chose himself to be the 
editor of Practice in Christianity. In the “Editor’s Preface,” Kierkegaard says,  “…I 
understand what is said as spoken to me alone – so that I might learn not only to resort to 
grace but to resort to it in relation to the use of grace.”186 Kierkegaard understood 
Practice in Christianity to be written to individuals, he himself being an individual.187 
Niels Jørgen Cappelørn notes that in order to understand the concept of offense in 
Practice in Christianity, one needs to recognize that it is always related to an individual.188 
III. Anti-Climacus 
 
Anti-Climacus is the author of Practice in Christianity. Anti-Climacus is also 
Kierkegaard’s last pseudonym. There are two reasons Kierkegaard uses Anti-Climacus as 
a pseudonym. First, Anti-Climacus is the ideal Christian. Second, Kierkegaard uses Anti-
                                                
185 Anti-Climacus says, “How the single individual will understand the invitation he 
[Christ] leaves up to the individual” (Kierkegaard, Practice, 14). What Anti-Climacus 
means is that Christ offers rest and leaves the decision to the individual to decide whether 
he will come or not come.  
186 Kierkegaard, Practice, 7. 
187 For instance, in discussing the invitation of the God-man, Anti-Climacus says “the 
inviter must invite all, although each one separately or as an individual” (Kierkegaard, 
Practice, 16).   
188 Cappelørn says, “Before we go further, it is important to keep in mind that offense 
always pertains to subjectivity, that is, that it is always related to the individual. Imagining 
“offense” without an “offended” person is perhaps not as difficult as imagining the son of 
a flute without a flutist, but in and of itself, offense is nevertheless an abstract concept… 
Just as love is actualized only when there is an individual who falls in love, so too is 
offense actualized only when there is an individual who becomes offended” (Niels Jørgan 
Cappelørn, “The Movements of Offense Toward, Away from, and Within Faith: Blessed 
is he who is not offended at me,” In International Kierkegaard Commentary: Practice in 
Christianity, Ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2004), 104.) 
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Climacus to speak with force and to speak indirectly. In the next two subsections, I shall 
explain both of these reasons in more detail. 
A. The Ideal Christian 
 
Marek says that "Anti-Climacus… portrays the ideality of a Christian existence as 
such; he is 'a Christian on an extraordinarily high level.'"189 Anti-Climacus has lived out 
the claims he makes in Practice in Christianity. Kierkegaard struggled over whether to 
publish Practice in Christianity under his own name or a pseudonym. Kierkegaard 
decided to use Anti-Climacus as a pseudonym because he felt his own life to be 
insufficient. Hannay explains why:  
He [Kierkegaard] now was to depict for people the high spiritual standards 
which religious faith and observance required, he nevertheless felt unable 
to present himself in his own person as someone able to exemplify those 
standards and to judge others.190  
 
Kierkegaard felt that his own life was an insufficient example. He had not lived out the 
ideal requirements of being a Christian in his own life. So he decided to use a pseudonym 
instead.  
 Anti-Climacus is also an ideal Christian in comparison to other pseudonyms. He is 
“higher” than the other pseudonyms. Previous pseudonyms have been coming from a 
point of view that lacks faith. Anti-Climacus, on the other hand, comes from a “decisively 
Christian standpoint,"191 as one with faith.  
The term Anti-Climacus comes out of an earlier pseudonym, Johannes Climacus. 
Johannes Climacus wrote Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific 
                                                
189 Jakub Marek, “Kierkegaard’s ‘Servant of the Word,’” In Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms, 
Eds. K. Nun & J. Stewart (Burlington, NC: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2015), 40. 
190 Hannay, “Homing in on Fear and Trembling,” 374. 
191 Marek, “Servant of the Word,” 40. 
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Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments as well as the posthumously published work 
Johannes Climacus. Hong & Hong, in their introduction to Practice in Christianity, say 
that the Latin root “anti” does not mean “against” as it usually means in the English 
language. They argue that Kierkegaard is using it to mean “‘before,’ a relation of rank, the 
higher as in ‘before’ in the First commandment.”192 As evidence for this interpretation of 
“anti,” Hong & Hong cite Kierkegaard’s journal which says, “There is something (the 
esthetic) that is lower and also pseudonymous, and something that is higher and also 
pseudonymous, because as a person I do not correspond to it [the higher].”193 What 
Kierkegaard means is that he, Kierkegaard, does not fit in with the higher pseudonym, 
Anti-Climacus, which Kierkegaard had not yet named at the time of writing of this journal 
entry. Also in Kierkegaard’s journal, Kierkegaard says, “Anti-Climacus will be the higher 
pseudonym, and thus the piece, ‘Climacus and Anti-Climacus’ cannot be used unless it 
should be by a new pseudonym.”194 Westphal agrees with Hong & Hong and adds that the 
reason Kierkegaard says Anti-Climacus is “higher” than Climacus is that he speaks 
directly rather than “dialectically humorous/serious and indirect.”195  
 Jakub Marek also interprets the term “anti” to mean that Anti-Climacus “assumes a 
higher standpoint”196 than other pseudonyms. In disagreeing with Hong & Hong, Marek 
adds that Anti-Climacus is also in “opposition”197 to earlier pseudonyms. Marek says, 
“Anti-Climacus is anti- or contra that which is non-Christian, opposing the non-Christian 
                                                
192 Kierkegaard, Practice, xiii.  
193 Kierkegaard, Practice, xiii.  
194 Kierkegaard, Practice, xiii.  
195 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 232. 
196 Marek, “Servant of the Word,” 40. 
197 Marek, “Servant of the Word,” 40. 
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existence, the standpoint of the ‘natural man.’”198 Marek qualifies his statement by saying 
that Anti-Climacus is not merely a “negation,”199 for Anti-Climacus repeats themes found 
in earlier works.  
I do not follow Marek’s interpretation in saying that Anti-Climacus is in opposition to 
other pseudonyms. Marek goes against what Kierkegaard says in his journal. Marek cites 
Kierkegaard’s journal, saying that Anti-Climacus is “a Christian on an extraordinarily 
high level.”200 Marek then goes on to say that “Johannes Climacus is the opposite of Anti-
Climacus.”201 Yet, clearly, Kierkegaard does not say that they are “opposite,” but that one 
is higher than the other. So Marek does not have evidence for why it is appropriate to 
interpret the term “anti” as “in opposition” rather than “higher or prior to.” In light of 
Kierkegaard’s journal entries, it fits better to interpret Anti-Climacus as a pseudonym that 
is higher than other pseudonyms.   
B. Anti-Climacus presents a Rigorous Requirement 
 
David D. Possen argues that Kierkegaard uses Anti-Climacus to speak “more 
rigorously than he himself dared” as a “necessary corrective for all lenient presentations of 
Christianity, including Kierkegaard’s own.”202 Anti-Climacus was able to be rigorous as a 
writer in that he set forward a strict and high standard for living. Possen explains that the 
standard for living is “imitatio Christi,”203 living according to the strict and high standard 
                                                
198 Marek, “Servant of the Word,” 40. 
199 Marek, “Servant of the Word,” 40. 
200 Marek, “Servant of the Word,” 40. 
201 Marek, “Servant of the Word,” 40. 
202 Possen, “The Voice of Rigor,” 163. 
203 Possen, “The Voice of Rigor,” 169. 
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put forward by Christ. This is intended to correct those who have presented the standards 
of Christ in a way that tones down the severity of imitatio Christi.   
According to Possen, Anti-Climacus presents a rigorous picture of Christianity so 
that one will recognize that all fail to meet this standard. Possen says, “imitatio Christi is 
the rigorous standard we all fail to meet; grace is the leniency we all therefore depend 
upon.”204 Consequently, one who lives by this high standard and fails can fall back onto 
“grace.” To Anti-Climacus, grace is the unmerited favor to one who “strives”205 toward 
imitatio Christi and fails. Possen says this is what Kierkegaard means in the preface to 
Practice in Christianity when he says, “So that I might learn not only to resort to grace but 
to resort to it in relation to the use of grace.”206 Lenient presentations of the requirements 
of what it takes to be a Christian give room for people to claim grace while unaware that it 
is necessary to continue to work at meeting the requirements of being a Christian. 
Consequently, one does not have “an honest encounter with the requirement of imitatio 
Christi.”207 So Anti-Climacus presents this rigorous account of Christianity as a corrective 
to previous lenient accounts.  
The main theme of Practice in Christianity is Anti-Climacus giving the requirements 
for acquiring faith to individuals. Anti-Climacus says that faith is a person [an individual] 
being a contemporary with the God-man,208 and who meets the requirements of believing 
his words and not being offended by the God-man.  
                                                
204 Possen, “The Voice of Rigor,” 172. 
205 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 252. 
206 Kierkegaard, Practice, 7. 
207 Possen, “The Voice of Rigor,” 174. 
208 I will use the following terms to refer to the same person: the God-man, Jesus Christ 
and Christ.   
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IV. Being a Contemporary 
 
In the “Invocation” of No. 1 Anti-Climacus says:  
But as long as there is a believer, this person, in order to have become that 
[a believer], must have been and as a believer must be just as contemporary 
with Christ’s presence as his contemporaries were. This contemporaneity is 
the condition of faith, and, more sharply defined, it is faith.209 
 
What Anti-Climacus means when he says that having faith is being a contemporary with 
the God-man is that one will think about the God-man just as he actually was physically 
on earth. He will think of himself as one who physically was with the God-man. Anti-
Climacus describes this state as residing “together in a house and liv[ing] together in a 
common life and in daily association with the poor and wretched.”210 
We discussed in chapter one the distinction between Religiousness A and 
Religiousness B.211 Religiousness A is when the individual senses great guilt in the 
presence of God and has a strong sense of God’s immanence. Religiousness B is the 
conversion to being a follower of the God-man through faith. Faith in Religiousness B is 
transcendent, taking its start from the paradox of Jesus Christ (the God-man) being both 
God and man, both infinite and finite. One who comes to faith goes through a “paradigm 
shift,”212 shifting out of a “human understanding.”213 
                                                
209 Kierkegaard, Practice, 9. 
210 Kierkegaard, Practice, 13. 
211 See chapter one, page 21 
212 Murray A. Rae, “The forgetfulness of historical-talkative Remembrance in 
Kierkegaard’s Practice in Christianity,” In International Commentary on Kierkegaard: 
Practice in Christianity, Ed. Robert L. Perkins, (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 
2004), 92. 
213 Kierkegaard, Practice, 59. 
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 Westphal calls this concept of faith “trans-cognitive.” 214 This means that faith 
presupposes certain facts about the world such as: God exists, has issued specific 
commands, is a personal being and desires to enter into a relationship with people. Also, it 
means that faith is personal in the sense that one takes on an “attitude or stance”215 like 
Christ’s contemporaries. To come to this stance one must believe that God has entered 
time as a human as the God-man.  
V. The God-Man 
 
The God-man is an important focus in Practice in Christianity.  Westphal 
discusses Anti-Climacus’ focus on the God-man in “Kenosis and Offense: A 
Kierkegaardian Look at Divine Transcendence.” Specifically, the God-man is “in the 
situation of abasement.”216 Discussing the God-man in his abasement is sometimes called 
kenosis. Kenosis refers to Christ’s emptying his divinity and appearing as a servant. 
Westphal says that in Practice in Christianity we find “a kenotic Christology.”217 Anti-
Climacus describes the God-man as kenosis:  
The inviter…is the abased Jesus Christ, the lowly man born of a despised 
virgin, his father a carpenter, in kinship with a few other common folk of 
the lowest class, this lowly man who moreover claimed to be God… So the 
lowly, destitute man with twelve poor disciples from the commonest class 
of people, for a long time an object of curiosity but later in the company 
only of sinners, tax collectors, lepers and madmen, because merely to let 
oneself be helped by him meant to risk one’s honor, life and goods, in any 
case exclusion from the synagogue.218 
 
                                                
214 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 26. 
215 Hartshorne, Kierkegaard, 33. 
216 Kierkegaard, Practice, 24. 
217 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 21. 
218 Kierkegaard, Practice, 37. 
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Anti-Climacus focuses on kenosis in two ways. First, Anti-Climacus focuses on 
Christ being human while claiming to be divine. He calls Christ’s kenosis an 
“omnipotently maintained incognito.”219 Anti-Climacus means that the God-man was 
really a person and his personhood was maintained “omnipotently.” Anti-Climacus does 
not mean that it was impossible to know who the God-man was. Rather, Anti-Climacus 
means that that the God-man did not merely appear to be human: the God-man was really 
a man with real human limitations. Second, Westphal says that Anti-Climacus focuses on 
Kenosis as the “continuing emphasis on Jesus as servant rather than master...”220 This 
refers to the lowliness of Christ, to the fact that although he claimed to be God, he lived as 
a servant who served people by meeting their needs.   
VI. Believing the God-man’s words 
 
So far we have seen that faith is a person being a contemporary with the God-man. 
In addition, one must meet two requirements to have faith: believing the God-man’s words 
and overcoming Offense. I shall begin by discussing believing the God-man's words; in 
the next section, I shall discuss overcoming offense. Silvia Walsh says, “Establishing its 
Christocentric focus at the outset, Practice in Christianity opens with an invitation from 
Christ to all those who labor and are burdened, that is, all those who are suffering, to come 
to him for rest.”221 Anti-Climacus focuses on the God-man’s words, “Come here to me, all 
you who labor and are burdened, and I will give you rest.”222 The God-man’s words are 
                                                
219 Kierkegaard, Practice, 131. 
220 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 22. 
221 Silvia Walsh, “Standing at the Crossroads: The Invitation of Christ to a Life of 
Suffering,” In International Kierkegaard Commentary: Practice in Christianity, Ed. 
Robert. L. Perkins, (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2004), 146. 
222 Kierkegaard, Practice, 11. 
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directed at people who are suffering. Anti-Climacus says that the rest Christ will give 
those who are suffering is not physical. Rather, he will free them from “sin.” Sin in 
Practice in Christianity is the sense of hopelessness and loneliness.223 Sin is the deep 
sense that one is lost and tumbling down into a state of hopelessness. Anti-Climacus uses 
the metaphor of a horse attached to an out-of-control cart:  
Whereas sin leads onward with winged speed, with mounting hate – or 
leads downward so easily, and indescribably easily, indeed, as easily as 
when the horse, completely relieved of pulling, cannot even with all its 
strength stop the wagon, which runs it into the abyss.224 
   
 Anti-Climacus explains that this invitation to believe the God-man’s words occurs 
at a “crossroad.”225 In one direction is the rest that Christ gives; in the other is sin. Anti-
Climacus says:  
Come here, all you who are lost and gone astray, whatever your error and 
sin, be it to human eyes more excusable and yet perhaps more terrible, or 
be it to human eyes more terrible and yet perhaps more excusable, be it 
disclosed here on earth or be it hidden and yet known in heaven – and even 
if you found forgiveness on earth but no peace within, or found no 
forgiveness because you did not seek it, or because you sought it in vain: 
oh, turn around and come here, here is rest!226 
 
At the crossroad, Christ calls out to give people rest from their sin, but, as Westphal puts 
it, there is “the barrier between the helper and those who need help.”227 This barrier is 
offense.  
 
                                                
223 To fully understand what Anti-Climacus means by “sin,” we would have to turn to a 
previous work written by Anti-Climacus, The Sickness unto Death. 
224 Kierkegaard, Practice, 19. 
225 Kierkegaard, Practice, 81.   
226 Kierkegaard, Practice, 19. 
227 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 255. 
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VII. Overcoming Offense 
 
Anti-Climacus defines offense in general as rejecting something because of a 
personal animosity toward the cause of offense.228 In Practice in Christianity, all with 
faith will have the possibility of offense. Anti-Climacus says, “One never comes to faith 
except from the possibility of offense.”229 A necessary part of having faith is the 
possibility of offense, but “offense is only possible, not necessary…”230 One can be 
offended by the God-man in different ways: a “preliminary offense,”231 essential offense 
(of which there are two forms) and offense at the God-man’s indirect communication. I 
shall discuss each these forms of offense separately in the next subsections. 
A. Preliminary Offense 
 
Preliminary offense is being offended by Christ because he is in “collision with an 
established order.”232 Anti-Climacus explains that the established order wants to be a 
totality that recognizes nothing above itself but “has every individual under it” and "judges 
every individual who subordinates himself to the established order.”233 The established 
order makes itself supreme, and individuals acquire meaning through it. It is not merely an 
abstract system of thought. It is the method, practices and traditions of a specific 
institution. This reflects Johannes’ discussion in Fear and Trembling of the ethical which 
                                                
228 I have adapted this general definition of offense from Cappelørn’s description of 
offense (Cappelørn’s, “The Movements of Offense,” 104-105).  
229 Kierkegaard, Practice, 81. 
230 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 256. 
231 Cappelørn, The Movements of Offense, 111. 
232 Kierkegaard, Practice, 85. 
233 Kierkegaard, Practice, 91.  
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is “the concrete universal, the community whose values sustain, guide, judge and reward 
the individual.”234  
 There are two things that should be noted about the established order. First, there is 
no “fear and trembling” in this order.235 Anti-Climacus explains this concept using a 
metaphor: “To live in such an established order, particularly to be something in it, is a 
continuation of being tied to mother’s apron strings or is even more secure.”236 There is a 
false security that comes along with being a part of the established order.237 “‘Why,’ says 
the established order to the single individual, ‘do you want to torture and torment yourself 
with the enormous criterion of ideality; turn to the established order, join the established 
order, here is the criterion.’”238 The individual’s own decisions are made by the 
established order without involving the person. One does not have to go through the 
anxiety and stress of figuring things out for oneself since it has already been prepared 
without involving the individual.  
Second, the established order is “deified.”239 The established order has made itself 
to be God in the sense that it is absolute. All things are understood and done in reference 
to it, even if they contradict God’s commands. Cappelørn explains, “A presupposition for 
the full realization of this preliminary offense is that the establishment has deified 
                                                
234 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 63.  
235 Kierkegaard, Practice, 90. 
236 Kierkegaard, Practice, 90. 
237 I think it is worth noting that Anti-Climacus sounds a lot like critics of the Soviet 
Union. Vaclav Havel’s “Power of the Powerless” is one example that is strangely similar 
to Anti-Climacus’ critique of the established order. 
238 Kierkegaard, Practice, 90. 
239 Kierkegaard, Practice, 91. 
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itself.”240 One who causes the established order to be offended does not necessarily intend 
it. Rather, it happens when the individual does not subordinate him or herself to the 
established order.  
In Christ’s day the established order was the “tradition of the elders.”241 In one 
passage that Anti-Climacus discusses, Christ offends the religious authorities by accusing 
them of being “hypocrites” because, Christ says, “for the sake of your tradition you have 
annihilated the command of God.”242 Because Christ points out that the established order 
of the Pharisees is not absolute, he brings himself into “collision” with it. Christ “revealed 
the highest ethical and religious ideals held by his contemporaries were sensuously and 
relatively determined, and lacked any relation to God’s word.”243 This means that the 
God-man is an “enemy… of the establishment.”244   
Cappelørn explains that preliminary offense can also occur with other people 
besides Christ. “He [Anti-Climacus] underscores the fact that this kind of preliminary 
offense – that is, an offense that remains within the human sphere – can also have other 
human beings as its object.”245 This offense can occur in any situation and does not 
involve the God-man directly. Rather, it focuses on the God-man who is against the 
established order.  
 
 
                                                
240 Cappelørn, The Movements of Offense, 111. 
241 Kierkegaard, Practice, 86. 
242 Kierkegaard, Practice, 85. 
243 Cappelørn, The Movements of Offense, 111. 
244 Cappelørn, The Movements of Offense, 112. 
245 Cappelørn, The Movements of Offense, 111. 
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B. Essential Offense 
 
Essential offense is being offended by the God-man in (at least) one of two ways. 
First is offense by Christ’s claim to divinity. Anti-Climacus says, “the possibility of 
offense in relation to loftiness, that an individual human being speaks or acts as if he were 
God, declares himself to be God, therefore in relation to the qualification ‘God’ in the 
composition God-man.”246Anti-Climacus is saying that people can be offended by Christ’s 
claim to divinity.  
Christ claims to be divine by pointing out his miracles, but he does not conclude 
that he is divine because of his miracles. Rather, the God-man concludes his 
“demonstration”247 with the statement, “blessed is he who is not offended at me.”248 
Christ’s demonstration brings a contemporary of him to the point of offense. 
Demonstrations about claims in mathematics are certain in their validity, “just as certain 
as “2+2=4.”249 No doubts are left about the conclusion. Yet a demonstration of Christ’s 
divinity with his miracles as the premise is “still ambiguous.”250 Demonstrations of 
divinity are different from demonstrations about claims in mathematics: whereas the latter 
are certain in their validity, the former are ambiguous because they can lead to different 
conclusions: faith or offense. Anti-Climacus explains, “The miracle can make you aware – 
now you are in the tension, and it depends upon what you choose, offense or faith; it is 
your heart that must be disclosed.”251 One has to make a choice after one understands the 
                                                
246 Kierkegaard, Practice, 94. 
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demonstration. The decision is open to how one wants to take it. Westphal says, “The 
phenomena, the data, [miracles] are open to two diametrically different interpretations: 
offense or faith.”252 Cappelørn says that the choice one makes does not depend on 
“straightforward knowledge”253 of Christ’s divinity. Rather, one has to decide without any 
“straightforward marks of his [Christ’s] divinity.”254 Westphal agrees with Cappelørn 
when he says:  
It is not ‘directly visible that Christ was the one he claimed to be.’ This is 
the sense in which Climacus255 (and Silentio) refer to faith as a leap, a 
decision without the security and support of an adequate ground.256  
 
Whether one chooses to believe Christ or be offended is ultimately arbitrary. 
The second essential offense involves the possibility of being offended by Christ’s 
lowliness. People are offended that the person they believe to be God is claiming to be a 
man. What Christ’s lowliness refers to is Christ being that “lowly, poor, suffering and 
finally powerless human being.”257 Anti-Climacus looks at examples in which people 
believe that Christ is divine but are offended that he would come down as a “powerless 
human being.” The first example is when the people are amazed that a lowly carpenter’s 
son was able to teach so well. They say  
is this not the carpenter’s son? Is his mother not called Mary? And his 
brothers James and Joseph and Simon and Judas? And are all his sisters not 
                                                
252 Kierkegaard, Practice, 270. 
253 Cappelørn, The Movements of Offense, 113. 
254 Cappelørn, The Movements of Offense, 114. 
255 Westphal does not mean Anti-Climacus. He is referring to an earlier chapter in his 
book in which he discusses Johannes Climacus’ claim that faith is a decision that is lacks 
any external reason or support for one’s decision.  
256 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 270.  
257 Kierkegaard, Practice, 102.  
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with us? Whence, then, did that man get all this? And they were offended 
at him.258  
 
Cappelørn explains that “If one puts emphasis on the sentence, ‘Is this not the carpenter’s 
son?” they are offended with regard to contemptibility, that is, they are offended by the 
fact that God is said to be the son of a simple laborer.”259 The people were offended by the 
social position of the person whom they believe to be God: this lowly man.260  
The second example is that Christ’s own disciples are offended that the person 
they believe to be God claims that he must suffer on a cross. Anti-Climacus describes their 
offense. “It [the disciple’s offense] is in relation to lowliness, that he, the loftily exalted 
one, the Father’s only begotten son, that he should suffer in this manner, that he should be 
surrendered powerless into the hands of his enemies.”261 Cappelørn again explains, 
“Everyone took offense, even the apostle Peter who had otherwise claimed that if 
necessary he would die together with Christ.”262  
It is important to recognize that offense from Christ’s lowliness or from his 
divinity are triggered only by thinking of oneself as a contemporary of Christ. Cappelørn 
explains, “The individual person must honestly imagine himself or herself as a 
contemporary of Christ in order to put himself or herself to the test: how would I as a 
contemporary of Christ react to him as the paradigmatic example?”263 The reason is that 
one must see that it is a mere man who is making these claims. One must try to determine 
                                                
258 Kierkegaard, Practice, 103. 
259 Cappelørn, The Movements of Offense, 115. 
260 Anti-Climacus says the “direction of the offense is ambiguous” (Kierkegaard, Practice, 
103) because one could interpret that the people are offended in the first kind of essential 
offense, offended that a man is claiming to be God.  
261 Kierkegaard, Practice, 103. 
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whether being a contemporary of Christ does not bring about offense when one is 
expected to imitatio Christi. 
In summary, essential offense can occur in one of two ways: one can be offended 
by the divinity of the God-man or by the lowliness of the God-man. The third and last 
form of offense is being offended by Christ’s indirect communication.  
C. Necessity of Indirect Communication 
 
The last category of offense arises from the fact that the God-man can use only 
indirect communication because he is a sign of a contradiction. Anti-Climacus defines a 
sign as “the denied immediacy or the second being that is different from the first 
being.”264 He explains that a sign is “something different from what it immediately is.”265 
The physical parts of a sign are not what it actually is. Rather a sign points beyond itself. 
Anti-Climacus explains that a sign of a contradiction is “a sign that intrinsically contains a 
contradiction in itself.”266 This means that there is a contradiction between the sign itself 
and its meaning. For instance, one drives up to a light which is green but sketched in the 
light is the word “stop.” The sign itself says “stop,” though we attribute to it the meaning 
“go.”  
The God-man is a sign of a contradiction when he communicates directly that he is 
God but one sees that he is merely a human, or when he communicates directly to those 
who believe that he is God the fact he is lowly. Cappelørn explains that these direct 
communications are a form of indirect communication, “Straightforward statements 
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function to draw attention to Christ in order that a human being will stumble on the 
contradiction, be shoved backwards and forced into a situation of choice. The decision 
either to believe in Christ or to be offended by him will thereby be disclosed.”267 The God-
man, in communicating himself to be God or that he is lowly, appears to his contemporary 
not to be this way. Because of this, Anti-Climacus claims that the God-man was able to 
speak only through indirect communication.  
Anti-Climacus distinguishes between two kinds of indirect communication. The 
first kind is when the communicator makes himself “into a nobody, purely objective, and 
then continually placing the qualitative opposites in a unity. This is what some 
pseudonymous writers are accustomed to calling the double-reflection of the 
communication.”268 The subject matter becomes the primary focus in this first kind of 
indirect communication, and the communicator becomes a “nonperson.”269 This means 
that the communicator is no longer a factor in how one interprets the subject matter. The 
“double reflection” refers to communicating two contradictory sides of an issue so that the 
result appears agreeable to both sides. Anti-Climacus uses the example of faith. Where 
someone presents faith in double reflection, those who hold faith see the presentation as a 
“defense of the faith and the atheist sees it as an attack.”270  
The other kind of indirect communication involves the speaker communicating 
about himself or living out his own communication. The speaker is not a nonperson as in 
the first kind of indirect communication but is what is being communicated. The 
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communicator is fundamental to the communication. This is the indirect communication 
of the God-man, an indirect communication that is used because the God-man is the sign 
of a contradiction and is unrecognizable as God.  Consequently, a contemporary of the 
God-man can be offended that the God-man does not speak directly and instead speaks 
with indirect communication.   
IX. Summary 
 
Anti-Climacus presents a rigorous account of faith as being a contemporary of the 
God-man and meeting the requirements of believing his words. When one becomes a 
contemporary with the God-man one can become offended by the God-man because the 
God-man is in collision with the established order, because he, as man, claims to be God 
or because he, as God, appears to be man, or because the God-man speaks indirectly. 
What we are going to look at next is how Johannes’ point of view of faith and Anti-
Climacus’ point of view of faith complement each other to form Kierkegaard’s view of 
faith.  
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Chapter 4 
 
I. Introduction 
 
At the outset of this thesis, I posed three questions. Chapter two and chapter three 
focus on the first two questions: What is Johannes de Silentio’s view of faith in Fear and 
Trembling, and what is Anti-Climacus’ view of faith in Practice in Christianity? In this 
chapter I will answer the third question: how are these Kierkegaard’s conclusions?  
This chapter has two parts. First, I look at important differences between Johannes 
and Anti-Climacus. Second, I will explain what I believe is Kierkegaard’s view of faith.  
II. Important Differences 
 
There are two important differences between Johannes and Anti-Climacus. The 
first is that they are at different stages in the Kierkegaard corpus. Johannes is at the ethical 
stage whereas Anti-Climacus is at the religious stage.  
Johannes is a pseudonym in tension. He is a poet seeking faith and admiring 
Abraham’s faith. He is offended at Abraham’s faith and at a “quasi-religious stage.”271 
This means he is at the ethical stage, where duty and living a moral life are fundamental. 
But he peers into the religious stage, where one is a follower of the God-man through 
faith.272  
In contrast to Johannes, Anti-Climacus is at the religious stage. Kierkegaard says 
that Anti-Climacus is a Christian “on an extraordinary high level.”273 Mackey describes 
                                                
271 Mooney, Knights of Faith, 5. 
272 My position is similar to Ryan Kemp who argues, as does Edward Mooney, that 
Johannes is a “knight of infinite resignation” (“Johannes de Silentio,”156).  
273 “Johannes Climacus places himself so low that he even says that he himself is not a 
Christian, one seems to be able to detect in Anti-Climacus that he considers himself to be 
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Anti-Climacus as "that 'ideal Christian' that never was and never will be."274 Because of 
his position as the ideal Christian, Anti-Climacus has the ability to call his audience to 
faith in a way that Kierkegaard believed he himself would not be able to.  
The second important difference between Johannes and Anti-Climacus is that they 
are writing in different genres. Fear and Trembling is a “dialectical lyric.”275 It is 
dialectical in the sense that there are two theses put in tension with one another. For 
instance, there is a tension between Abraham being a murderer and a man of faith. It is 
lyrical in that Johannes has a tendency toward the dramatic and storytelling. He has an 
eulogy to Abraham and three exordiums. The focus of the work is the story of Abraham’s 
sacrifice of Isaac.   
Johannes’ “dialectical lyric” forms a confusing but stimulating picture of faith. 
Johannes’ goal is to challenge the Danish people to consider whether or not they have 
faith. He says near the beginning: "But the point is to perceive the greatness of what 
Abraham did so that the person can judge for himself whether he has the vocation and the 
courage to be tried in something like this."276 Poetry and dialectics are used to encourage 
the reader to consider for themselves whether they have faith.   
The genre of Practice in Christianity is different from that of Fear and Trembling. 
It is a religious work intended “for awakening and inward deepening.”277 Rather then 
encouraging the reader to consider for themselves whether they have faith, Anti-Climacus 
                                                
a Christian on an extraordinarily high level… I would place myself higher than Johannes 
Climacus, lower than Anti-Climacus” (JP, VI 6433). 
274 Mackey, Points of View, 245.  
275 This is the subtitle of Fear and Trembling.  
276  Kierkegaard Fear and Trembling, 53. 
277 This is the subtitle of No. 1 of Practice in Christianity.  
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is calling on individuals to be contemporaries of the God-man.278 He lays out the call of 
the God-man and the possibility of offense faced by contemporaries of the God-man.  
Anti-Climacus’ call to faith forms a clearer and fuller picture of faith. His goal is 
to “help in making people aware of the situation and help them understand.”279 Unlike 
Johannes, who seeks simply to challenge Danish society’s view of faith, Anti-Climacus 
seeks to give people a picture that will awaken them to consider the possibility of faith.  
Although Johannes and Anti-Climacus are at different stages and writing in 
different genres, their differences complement one another in a way that helps us see what 
Kierkegaard’s own view of faith is.  
III. Kierkegaard’s Conclusion about Faith 
 
Johannes does not understand faith because he lacks faith. He lacks faith because 
he lacks the courage to carry it out.  To Anti-Climacus in Practice in Christianity, faith is 
when one becomes a contemporary with the God-man and lacks offense. Given their 
conclusions, I argue that Kierkegaard’s view of faith is the aligning of the self in a 
trusting280 relationship with the God-man. One outside of faith can perceive faith to be a 
paradox or find faith offensive; one must have faith to avoid offense and overcome the 
paradox.  
                                                
278 In the “Invocation,” Anti-Climacus says, “Lord Jesus Christ, would that we, too, might 
become contemporary with you in this way, might see you in your true form and in the 
surroundings of actuality as you walked here on earth” (Kierkegaard, Practice, 9).  
279 Marek, “Servant of the Word,” 46-47.  
280 I am using the term “trust” as John J. Davenport does in “Faith as Eschatological Trust 
in Fear and Trembling.” Davenport defines it as a “firm conviction that God’s revealed 
promise will be fulfilled” (John J. Davenport, Faith as Eschatological Trust in Fear and 
Trembling,” In Ethics, Love and Faith, Ed. Edward F. Mooney (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008), 201).  
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A. Aligning the Self 
 
We see how faith is the aligning the self in Fear and Trembling with Johannes’ 
struggle with the paradox of Abraham’s faith. Johannes says that if there is no faith then 
Abraham is “lost”281 and a “murderer”282 because he is making a moral mistake in light of 
society’s rules that govern ethical norms (the ethical or the universal). Johannes’ point of 
view of faith is that to have it, one must be aligned to receive guidance outside society’s 
ethical norms. “Thus there is a paradox, that the single individual or the self as the single 
individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute.”283 Johannes’ single individual, or 
self, is Abraham. Johannes thinks that Abraham is not acting as a member of culture: 
Society has not made the decision for him. Society makes decisions for an individual 
when they act in accordance with its rules and principles. Abraham has self-consciously 
chosen to sacrifice Isaac. Abraham makes his decision from the position of an “absolute 
relationship,” a relationship that transcends the ethical norms of his society. The absolute 
is God who issued Abraham a command to sacrifice his son. So Abraham, as a 
self/individual, is aligned so that he is outside the ethical and in a position that is directly 
open to the command of God.   
We also see this aligning of the self in Anti-Climacus when he says that having 
faith is one being a contemporary with the God-man. This means taking on an “attitude or 
stance” 284  like Christ’s contemporaries. Westphal explains that one with faith “is in the 
same epistemic situation as those who were eyewitness contemporaries of the inviter and 
                                                
281 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 81. 
282 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 66. 
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the invitation.”285 Faith is aligning of the self when one comes into the same epistemic 
position as Christ’s contemporaries. An epistemic position is a point of view or 
perspective that provides knowledge. To be in the same epistemic position as another 
means to have a similar point of view that provides the same or similar knowledge. This is 
similar to Abraham’s position. Both a contemporary of the God-man and Abraham are 
directly open to the command of God.  
B. A Trusting Relationship 
 
To Kierkegaard, faith is when the self is aligned in a trusting relationship with 
God. Johannes sees that Abraham is in a trusting relationship with God. Abraham “has an 
absolute duty to God.”286 Abraham was required to give up Isaac, believing that Isaac’s 
death was inevitable, but he trusted God to fulfill God’s original promise to provide 
Abraham an heir.  
 Likewise, in Practice in Christianity, the God-man calls “come here...and I will 
give you rest.”287 In return for becoming a contemporary with the God-man, one finds rest 
from one’s sin. Yet, one has to trust that this man who claims to be God is who he claims 
to be. There is no “demonstration”288 that gives sufficient reason to believe his words. 
Rather, one must first come into the relationship, trusting the God-man. Westphal 
describes this trusting as “a mode of understanding” that has “its own interior rationale.” 
There is a ‘logic of insanity.’”289 What this means is that this “trusting” makes sense only 
                                                
285 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 257.  
286 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 70. 
287 Kierkegaard, Practice, 11.  
288 Kierkegaard, Practice, 95, 96, 26, 27.  
289 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 260. Westphal is quoting from Walter 
Lowrie’s earlier translation. (See Walter Lowrie, Fear and Trembling, Princeton: 
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when one first agrees with it. Sufficient reasons emerge with the experience of being in 
this trusting relationship. Once one believes the God-man’s words, according to Anti-
Climacus, then one begins to acquire reasons for believing it.  
 Johannes is one looking at this “logic of insanity” from the outside and, precisely 
because he is outside it, he is unable to understand it. Abraham trusts God to return Isaac 
though God commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. Johannes does not understand how 
Abraham can trust God to return Isaac. 
C. Relationship with the God-man 
 
In Fear and Trembling Johannes does not speak much about God, much less the 
God-man.290 The focus is on Abraham and his relationship to God.291 The reason is that 
Johannes did not have faith, and so it is reasonable to expect that he focuses on one with 
faith rather than the object of faith. The God-man is the primary focus of Practice in 
Christianity. The God-man is God in human form. Also, he is in a state of “abasement.”292 
Earlier we referred to this as kenosis, which is Christ’s emptying his divinity and 
appearing as a servant. Because of his state, the God-man appears as if he is merely 
human to his contemporaries. Yet, the God-man claimed to be divine. One with faith will 
believe his words to be true in spite of the offense.  
 
                                                
Princeton University Press, 1944, 58.) The Hong translation reads “as they say in the 
context of madness” (Practice, 54). 
290 Jesus is mentioned twice (28, 66), and they are off-hand comments.  
291 In “Fear and Trembling’s ‘Attunement’ as Midrash,” Jacob Howland explains that 
Johannes “effectively rewrite[s] the Akedah as a story in which Abraham has no 
substantial personal relationship or special familiarity with God” (35).  
292 Kierkegaard, Practice, 36. 
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D. Overcoming the Absurdity and Avoiding Offense 
 
To Kierkegaard, in order to come to faith one must avoid offense and overcome 
the absurd. Johannes views Abraham’s faith as “absurd.”293 It presents a paradox to him 
since he is understanding faith from the point of view of the ethical. Westphal claims that 
in “all Kierkegaardian texts”294 concepts like faith being absurd are “only such in relation 
to ‘human understanding,’ which is… finite.”295 With Johannes, he understands 
Abraham’s faith from the point of view of the ethical.  
Stephen Evans explains that the ethical begins with the assumption that one can 
live life within the domain of the ethical. The problem is that “this tidy, rational 
assumption is contradicted by experience; it [religious life] begins with the discovery that 
actual existence is 'incommensurable' with the demands of ethics.’"296 Certain areas of life 
are unable to meet the standards given by the ethical, which means that the ethical is 
incomplete and creates certain absurdities like God commanding Abraham to sacrifice 
Isaac but promising Abraham an heir. Evans says that faith comes by “grounding [the self] 
in a reality that transcends society.”297 This means that one overcomes the absurdity by 
having a “direct and personal relationship with God.”298   
Anti-Climacus claims that one must avoid offense before one comes to faith. 
Offense can take different forms, but the way one avoids offense is by living “in fear and 
                                                
293 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 40, 46, 69. 
294 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 22 footnote 7. 
295 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept, 22 footnote 7.  
296 C. Stephen Evans, “Faith as the Telos of Morality,” In Kierkegaard and the Self: 
Collected Essays, Ed. Stephen Evans, (Waco: Baylor University Press, 1998), 19.  
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trembling.”299 Fear and trembling “signify that we are in the process of becoming… and… 
signify that there is a God – something every human being and every Established Order 
ought not to forget for a moment.”300 Westphal considers this passage to be the “heart of 
Practice in Christianity.”301 He explains that what Anti-Climacus means is that “faith is 
the recognition of the relativity of our individual beliefs and behaviors and of our 
collective theories and practices – before God.”302  In order to avoid offense, one can 
include overcoming the absurd in this by recognizing that one’s point of view is not 
universal but relative before God.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
I set out with three questions. In Chapter one, I examined the connection between 
Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms. This gave the groundwork to answer the first two 
questions, what is Johannes’ view of faith and what is Anti-Climacus’ view of faith, 
questions I sought to answer in chapters two and three, respectively. In this last chapter I 
explained how one can use Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms to explain his view of faith. 
According to Kierkegaard, faith is the aligning of the self in a trusting relationship with 
the God-man. One outside of faith can perceive faith to be a paradox or find faith 
offensive; one must have faith to avoid offense and overcome the paradox.  
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